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Consumers as Tax Auditors†
By Joana Naritomi*
To investigate the enforcement value of  third-party information on 
potentially collusive taxpayers, I study an  anti-tax evasion program 
that rewards consumers for ensuring that firms report sales and estab-
lishes a verification system to aid  whistle-blowing consumers in São 
Paulo, Brazil (Nota Fiscal Paulista). Firms reported sales increased 
by at least 21 percent over 4 years. The results are consistent with fixed 
costs of concealing collusion, increased detection probability from 
whistle-blower threats, and with behavioral biases associated with lot-
teries amplifying the enforcement value of the program. Although firms 
increased reported expenses, tax revenue net of rewards increased by 
9.3 percent. (JEL D22, H25, H26, L25, O14, O17)
Tax revenue as a share of GDP is substantially higher in modern advanced econ-
omies than in the early twentieth century or in  present-day developing countries 
(Besley and  Persson 2014). A key source of the variation in tax revenue is the 
enforcement capacity of governments.1 In particular, a growing literature empha-
sizes that information on taxable transactions shared with  third-parties can be lever-
aged by governments to ensure more accurate  self-reporting,2 and that the increased 
availability of  third-party information trails as countries develop could help explain 
1 Musgrave (1969) emphasized the historical relevance of tax administration for tax collection. In the policy 
debate, tax administration and the enforcement capacity of developing country governments are central issues 
(Slemrod and Gillitzer 2013, Bird and Gendron 2007, International Monetary Fund 2011).
2 Audit experiments typically detect near zero evasion in income subject to  third-party reporting (Kleven 
et al. 2011, Pomeranz 2015). For instance, wage earners would face a much higher risk of audit relative to the 
 self-employed if they  under-report income, as firms typically also report wages paid to the government (Slemrod 
2007). More generally, information trails shared with  third-parties such as employees, suppliers, banks, or custom-
ers could have a deterrence effect even if they are not systematically reported to the government. Evidence from 
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the dynamics of government revenue among advanced economies during the last 
century (Gordon and Li 2009; Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez 2016).
Despite the empirical literature on the deterrence effect of  third-party reporting, 
there is little direct evidence on whether changes in availability of information trails 
can improve compliance and on the mechanisms through which  third-party reporting 
deters evasion, as it hinges on avoiding collusion opportunities among the informed 
parties.3 This paper exploits  quasi-experimental variation and unique administra-
tive data on firms and consumers from an  anti-tax evasion program in São Paulo, 
Brazil (Nota Fiscal Paulista, or NFP) that created monetary rewards for consumers 
to ensure that firms report final sales transactions. The program provides tax rebates 
and monthly lottery prizes for consumers who ask for receipts, and establishes a 
direct communication channel between the tax authority and consumers through an 
online account system, where consumers can verify receipts reported by firms and 
can act as  whistle-blowers by filing complaints.
The program was designed to address the “last mile” problem of the  self-enforcing 
mechanism of the value added tax (VAT). Along the supply chain, the tax credit 
and debit system of the VAT generates  third-party reporting in transactions across 
firms.4 At the final consumer stage, however, these  self-enforcing incentives break 
down since consumers typically derive no direct monetary benefit from asking for 
receipts.5 The NFP policy introduced incentives similar to the VAT for final sales: it 
aims to affect both the likelihood that a transaction is reported at all, and the accu-
racy of reporting, since rewards to consumers are an increasing function of the value 
of receipts.6
I begin by laying out a conceptual framework to discuss how incentives to con-
sumers can affect firm behavior. The NFP policy is effectively increasing the avail-
ability of  third-party information trails through rewards to consumers, but collusion 
between consumers and firms could hinder the  self-enforcing effect of  third-party 
information. However, in order to collude with consumers and continue evading, 
firms would need to transfer part of evasion rents to consumers through discounts 
and incur in a fixed cost to set the collusive deal. Moreover, firms would reveal 
evasion information to many third parties by conditioning the discount on not accu-
rately reporting the transaction to the government. As in Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez 
(2016), the difficulty in sustaining collusion with a large number of informed 
Denmark and the United States suggests that even when income is not subject to systematic  third-party reporting, 
compliance is well below full evasion, which could be explained in part by the existence of derivative information 
shared with  third-parties (Kleven 2014).
3 This is a  well-known issue in the mechanism design literature (e.g., Tirole 1986): once more than one person 
is informed about evasion then there are many mechanisms that can be used to elicit that information (Besley 
and Persson 2013). A key assumption in these cases is that there is no scope for collusion among the informed 
parties. For instance, Yaniv (1993) argues that employers and employees can find mutually beneficial opportunities 
to reduce their tax liabilities, which would result in limited enforcement effect on  self-reports of individual income 
subject to  cross-reporting by firms.
4 Most countries in the world adopted the VAT instead of sales tax, perhaps because of its enforcement advan-
tage (Keen and Lockwood 2010). Kopczuk and Slemrod (2006) argue that retail sales tax and the VAT are theoreti-
cally equivalent, but the VAT has  built-in enforcement incentives along the supply chain. Pomeranz (2015) provides 
empirical evidence for the  self-enforcing properties of the VAT in  business-to-business transactions.
5 Slemrod (2007) refers to the enforcement problem at the final consumer stage as the “Achilles’ heel” of admin-
istering a retail sales tax: if firms collude to under-report transactions, the  self-enforcing mechanism can unravel, 
and may hinder tax collection across the entire chain.
6 Both the tax rebate and the number of lottery tickets with which consumers are rewarded are a function of the 
total amount they spend in a given month as detailed in Section IIB.
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 economic agents who can act as  whistle-blowers might be important to deter eva-
sion. Therefore, the effect of consumer monitoring should be stronger the higher the 
threat of  whistle-blowing, and the more costly it is for firms to match the value of 
the rewards offered by the government.
In order to empirically investigate the extent to which rewards to consumers can 
affect firm compliance, I construct unique administrative data on  firm-level monthly 
tax returns, monthly  individual-level data on requested receipts and overall partici-
pation in the NFP program, based on administrative records from the tax authority 
of the state of São Paulo.7 I divide my analysis into four parts. First, I study the 
effect of consumer monitoring on firms’ compliance by exploiting variation in the 
intensity of exposure to the policy. I compare reported revenue changes in firms 
that sell mostly to final consumers (retail) versus firms that sell mostly to other 
firms (wholesale). I estimate that reported revenue in retail increased on average by 
21 percent over 4 years as a result of NFP. This estimate is likely to be a lower bound 
for the effect of the program, given that wholesale firms may also have been affected 
by the change in consumers’ decisions to ask for receipts.8
Second, I shed light on mechanisms by examining the implications from the con-
ceptual framework for firms subject to higher  whistle-blower threats, and by dis-
cussing the role of rewards offered by the government on consumer participation in 
the enforcement policy. I find evidence consistent with the argument that collusion 
might be costly and difficult to sustain if consumers can blow the whistle. Firms 
in sectors that typically have a high volume of transactions and sell small ticket 
items are affected more, consistent with fixed costs to collude with consumers. Also, 
firms in sectors that are characterized by a large number of different consumers, that 
would be more exposed to potential  whistle-blowers, are relatively more affected by 
the consumer rewards program. Furthermore, I link consumer participation to firm 
compliance by exploiting the timing of consumers’  whistle-blowing and find that 
firms report 7 percent more receipts and 3 percent more revenue after receiving the 
first complaint.
Third, I turn to the effects of rewards on consumer participation. As suggested by 
the conceptual framework, the more consumers value the rewards, the more costly 
it will be for firms to try to match the government’s incentives. I exploit variation 
from lottery prize rewards from NFP to analyze changes in the number of receipts 
that individuals ask for and the total value of receipts. I find that consumers condi-
tion their decisions to ask for receipts on past lottery wins. Even when prizes are as 
small as US$5, winners ask for receipts more often for at least six months after the 
lottery result relative to  non-winners with the same odds of getting a prize. In addi-
tion, I find an increase of US$16.14 (SE 3.08) in the total value of receipts during 
the six months after the lottery, so the effect cannot be attributed to the cash prize 
alone. The results are consistent with the possibility that lotteries amplify consumer 
engagement due to behavioral biases.
7 A number of measures were taken to  de-identify the data in order to protect confidential tax records.
8 Wholesale firms can sell to final consumers directly, in which case the rewards program applies. Additionally, 
improving compliance among retail firms can affect compliance by wholesalers through the  self-enforcing mech-
anism of the VAT.
3034 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW SEPTEMBER 2019
In the final part of the paper, I discuss implications for tax policy. First, I analyze 
how tax liabilities were affected by the policy. An increase in reported revenue could, 
in principle, be circumvented by adjustments in reported expenses. I find that firms 
significantly increase reported inputs, but not enough to offset the effect of reported 
revenue on value added. I estimate that the NFP program increased reported tax 
liabilities by 25.9 percent. However, through the incentives to consumers, govern-
ments are foregoing a fraction of both marginal and  infra-marginal revenue, so it is 
not obvious  ex ante that a positive effect on tax revenue would be sufficient to cover 
the costs of the program. I calculate that tax revenue increased by 9.3 percent net 
of rewards. Finally, I discuss welfare implications of consumer reward policies by 
considering social costs and benefits, and the impacts on firms, consumers, and the 
government.
This paper contributes to the vast literature on tax enforcement (e.g., Andreoni, 
Erard, and  Feinstein 1998; Slemrod and  Yitzhaki 2002) by providing evidence 
on how a policy can tap into local information on tax evasion, and leverage fric-
tions to collusion in order to increase compliance in a  hard-to-tax sector. In par-
ticular, this paper contributes to a growing literature that argues that  third-party 
information is key for compliance (Kleven et al. 2011; Pomeranz 2015; Kumler, 
Verhoogen, and Frias 2012). Additionally, the paper contributes to the literature 
on the challenges of tax enforcement in developing countries, which is believed 
to be a key determinant of countries’ choices of tax instruments (e.g., Gordon 
and Li 2009, Best et al. 2015, Jensen 2019). In particular, a growing strand of the 
literature sets aside  noncompliance due to firm nonregistration at the tax authority, 
the  formal-informal margin, and instead examines  noncompliance among formal 
firms.9
The paper also contributes to the policy debate on sales tax enforcement. Many 
countries adopted policies to reward consumers to address the last mile problem 
of the VAT.10 This paper provides, to my knowledge, the first direct evidence of 
consumer behavioral responses to rewards from asking for receipts. The results also 
reinforce existing findings on individual responses to lotteries that are used as levers 
in other contexts, such as  lottery-linked savings (Tufano 2008, Kearney et al. 2010). 
Moreover, the evidence from the NFP lotteries adds to the literature on the behav-
ioral effects of lottery wins such as the lucky store effect (Guryan and  Kearney 
2008). More generally, the paper sheds light on the effects of participatory policies 
used as a monitoring tool.
Finally, the paper contributes to the debate on how other margins of adjustment 
(e.g., reported expenses) may compensate for an increase in enforcement of reve-
nue reporting. In the context of corporate income tax (CIT), Carrillo, Pomeranz, 
and Singhal (2017) and Slemrod et al. (2017) find that reported costs substantially 
9 De Paula and Scheinkman (2010) argue that better enforcement in the intensive margin of VAT systems can 
endogenously generate incentives to formalize by creating supply chains of formal firms. See Bruhn and McKenzie 
(2014) for a review of the literature on the formalization of firms.
10 For instance, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Italy, Portugal, Puerto Rico, 
South Korea, and Slovakia, among other countries, have introduced policies to address the enforcement problem 
downstream through monetary incentives (through tax refunds, lotteries, or fines) for consumers to request receipts 
(Fooken, Hemmelgarn, and Herrmann 2015; Bird 1992; Cowell 2004; Fabbri 2015; Marchese 2009). Wan (2010) 
argues that a program that turns receipts into lottery tickets in China was effective in raising tax revenue, but the 
evidence for such policies is mixed (Barroso and Cortez 2007; Mattos, Rocha, and Toporcov 2013).
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increase, offsetting to a large extent the profit change from more accurate revenue 
reporting. In both cases, the cost increase occurred primarily in difficult to verify 
margins such as “other expenses.” In the case of the VAT, the ability to adjust inputs 
is arguably relatively more limited as a tax credit must be another firms’ tax debit. 
The findings of this paper indicate that reported expenses can be adjusted in a VAT 
context, but perhaps to a lesser extent than in CIT due to the  self-enforcing feature 
of the VAT.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section  I outlines a sim-
ple conceptual framework to guide the empirical analysis. Section II describes the 
institutional background of the Nota Fiscal Paulista program, the relevant datasets, 
sample definitions, and summary statistics. Section III investigates the enforcement 
effect of the introduction of  third-party information through consumer rewards on 
firms’ reported revenue, and Section IV sheds light on mechanisms suggested by 
the conceptual framework regarding  whistle-blower threats, collusion costs, and the 
value of monetary rewards. Section V examines the impact on expenses and tax rev-
enue, and discusses implications for tax policy. Section VI concludes.
I. Conceptual Framework
I begin the analysis by describing a simple conceptual framework that exam-
ines the degree to which consumer monitoring can affect the evasion decision by 
firms. I use a variant of the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) framework discussed 
by Kleven et al. (2011), in which the probability that a taxpayer is caught evading 
depends on the audit rate and the probability of detection conditional on an audit. 
First, I present a baseline case with government monitoring only. Then, I intro-
duce consumer monitoring as an additional enforcement tool that gives rewards for 
consumers to ensure firms report final sales transactions, and allows consumers to 
act as  whistle-blowers. In this case, firms may continue evading by colluding with 
consumers. In doing so, however, firms get a lower benefit from evasion and reveal 
to a number of  third-parties evasion information that the government may access 
through  whistle-blowers. As a result, firms will increase compliance.11
A. A Tax Evasion Model
Consider a  risk-neutral firm that pays a tax  τ ∈  [0, 1] proportional to their 
reported revenue  Y ≥ 0 . Suppose that firms sell a single product, and that each firm 
has  N consumers who each make one purchase which generates revenue  y ¯ ≥ 0. 
Firms have a true  pretax revenue  Y ¯ = N y ¯ , and choose to report revenue  Y to maxi-
mize profits  π , which depends on enforcement policies.
Government Monitoring Only.—Let  p ∈  [0, 1] be the probability of detection 
faced by the firm. Similarly to Kleven et al. (2011), I assume that the audit probabil-
ity is increasing in the amount evaded, and that the probability governments detect 
11 I take a positive approach to understand the effects of different monitoring tools on firms’ evasion decision. 
For a normative approach, see Arbex and Mattos (2015), who investigate how the Ramsey equation is modified once 
consumers are rewarded to ask for receipts.
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evasion is a product of government audits and the likelihood that the  government 
will uncover evasion by taxpayers during an audit. Kleven (2014) argues that the 
more derivative information from various third-party sources is available to tax 
enforcement, the more compliance we observe despite low audit rates. The intuition 
is that the more information the government has about the firm, the easier it is to 
detect evasion conditional on an audit (Slemrod 2007).
Let  a (E) ∈  [0, 1] be the audit probability,  E =  Y ¯ − Y be the total eva-
sion by firm, and  d ∈  [0, 1] be the ability of the government to detect eva-
sion in an audit. The probability of detection faced by the firm can be written as 
 p ≡ a (E) d ,  p ′ (E) =  a ′ (E) d > 0 . If the firm is caught evading, the government 
applies a fine  θ ≥ 0 in proportion to the evaded tax  τ  ( Y ¯ − Y) . For simplicity, 
assume that in the absence of monetary incentives, consumers do not ask for receipts 
and have no impact on the evasion decision of firms. Thus, firms report revenue  Y 
to maximize
(1)  π =  ( Y ¯ − τY) (1 − p) +  [ (1 − τ) Y ¯ − θτ ( Y ¯ − Y) ] p .
An interior optimal solution  Y  ⁎ satisfies the first-order condition  dπ / dY = 0: 12
(2)  [a (E) +  a ′ (E) · E] d (1 + θ) = 1 .
The right-hand side of equation (2) is the marginal benefit of evading an extra 
dollar, and the  left-hand side is the marginal cost of evading that extra dollar. As 
discussed in Kleven et al. (2011), the firm that evades an extra dollar incurs in a 
higher probability of audit of all  infra-marginal dollars evaded. Firms choose the 
optimal  Y  ⁎ that satisfies equation  (2), and  Y  ⁎ will be increasing in the detection 
probability  d .13
Adding Consumer Monitoring.—For simplicity, I assume that if a firm issues 
a receipt, that transaction will be reported correctly.14 Now, suppose the govern-
ment creates targeted incentives for consumers to ask for receipts. Consider the case 
where consumers are rewarded with  α ∈  [0, 1] of the tax  τ firms pay on the transac-
tion reported to the government. Consumers can ensure they receive this reward by 
requesting a receipt, and they can act as  whistle-blowers by informing the govern-
ment about firms’  noncompliance.
Let  κ (α) be how much consumers value the rewards  α from the program, where 
 κ (α) ≥ 0 and  κ ′ (α) ≥ 0 . Let  κ (0) = 0 , in which case we are back to government 
12 The  second-order condition is  2 a ′ (E) +  a ″ (E) E > 0 . It is necessary and sufficient that  Ea (E) is convex, 
which is essentially the same condition as in Kleven et al. (2011).
13 Given the convexity of  Ea (E) ,  ∂ Y  ∗ /∂ d =  [a (E) +  a ′ (E) ∙ E] (1 + θ) / (2 a ′ (E) +  a ″ (E) E) > 0 .
14 Receipts are an important tool for enforcement, which is the main rationale for consumer rewards programs in 
the first place. Therefore, I will refer to firms’ decision to issue a receipt as being equivalent to a decision to report 
a transaction. It is possible that even after issuing a receipt, firms may try to erase those records (using zappers or 
phantom ware, for instance), but it is costly. In the São Paulo context, billing machines that issue receipts with time 
stamps and serial codes were already widespread since the early 2000s. Across the world, the adoption of Electronic 
Billing Machines that send data in real time to governments are making such ex post changes quite difficult.
3037NARITOMI: CONSUMERS AS TAX AUDITORSVOL. 109 NO. 9
monitoring only.15 For instance, if consumers are unaware of the program,  κ (α) can 
be close to zero even if  α > 0 . If consumers enjoy participating in the program 
above and beyond the monetary value attached to it,  κ (α) > α . This could occur, 
for instance, if consumers enjoy playing the lottery or value engaging in a tax com-
pliance program. There could also be a framing effect from rewards: a tax rebate, for 
instance, may help segregate small gains, making it more valuable than a discount of 
the same amount (Thaler 1999).16
As the government is rewarding consumers with a fraction of what firms pay in 
taxes, firms and consumers could potentially agree to a  mutually beneficial deal 
and not issue receipts.17 For simplicity, assume that firms make a take it or leave it 
discount offer to consumers to continue reporting  y instead of the true amount  y ¯ , and 
that consumers accept a discount deal that matches the difference with respect to the 
government’s reward  κ (α) τ  ( y ¯ − y) .
It is important to note that not only must the firm share part of their evasion rents 
with the consumer, the firm reveals to a third party that it evades taxes by condition-
ing the discount on not reporting the true amount of the transaction. Consumers, 
therefore, become informed  third parties. As consumers can act as  whistle-blowers, 
governments may gain access to relevant information about firms’ evasion. Thus, 
the firm might face an increased detection probability if consumers cannot commit 
not to  whistle-blow.18
Kleven (2014) argue that a key deterrent of collusion is the sheer number of inter-
nal or external parties to which a firm that evades taxes exposes itself. I consider the 
case where there is a positive probability of a random shock between the parties that 
can trigger a consumer to blow the whistle. A random shock could be generated by 
some conflict between the consumer and the shopkeeper, or a moral concern of the 
consumer. Therefore, the larger the number of consumers  N , the higher the addi-
tional risk of detection introduced by consumers that may act as  whistle-blowers.
Assume  ε > 0 is the probability that such a random shock occurs; let  ε be i.i.d. 
across consumers. Assume that if one consumer blows the whistle on the firm the 
information she provides allows the government to detect evasion with certainty in 
an audit, and that all the  N consumers may blow the whistle. The intuition is that 
consumers are gathering relevant information about evasion conducted by firms that 
can improve the enforcement capacity of the government for a given audit rate. So 
the ability of the government to detect evasion under consumer monitoring will be 
a function of  N and can be written as  d c (N) = 1 −  (1 − d)  (1 − ε) N ,  d c ′(N) > 0 . 
15 If  κ (0) > 0 , i.e., consumers value compliance per se, the policy could have an effect even if there are no 
monetary rewards, just a  whistle-blower channel. In this case, the problem of the firm would be similar as it would 
try to match this taste for compliance with a discount, and providing a tool to  whistle-blow firms could be valuable 
to create credible threats of  ε > 0 .
16 Based on prospect theory, framing outcomes separately could yield larger gains as the gain function is steep-
est at the origin. The utility of a small gain, therefore, could exceed the utility of slightly reducing a large loss.
17 Tirole (1986) discusses the collusion problem in auditing contracts in which a group of informed parties (the 
auditor and the agent) can manipulate the information reported to the principal. This context is also similar to the 
case of corruption with theft in Shleifer and Vishny (1993).
18 In the empirical context, it is particularly salient that a collusive deal will allow the firm to evade taxes since 
the government is giving a reward for consumers to ask for receipts in a campaign against tax evasion. Also, as will 
be described in detail in Section II, consumers can be whistle-blowers by filing complaints about specific firms to 
the government through a website.
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Therefore, firms face an increased probability of getting caught  p c given by 
 p c = a (E) [1 −  (1 − d)  (1 − ε) N ] .19
Finally, suppose that when firms make an offer to a consumer, they pay a fixed 
cost  ρ > 0 . The fixed cost can be thought of as a concealment cost paid to reach a 
collusive deal in each transaction. I assume that, if firms evade taxes, they adopt a 
collusion policy that applies to all transactions and must pay  ρ > 0 as concealment 
cost. In online Appendix C, I discuss an alternative case in which firms only collude 
with a fraction of the transactions. The main point of collusion costs is to emphasize 
how frictions from concealing a collusive deal with a large number of parties can 
contribute to increase compliance.
Now firms choose  Y to maximize20
(3)  π =  ( Y ¯ − τY) (1 −  p c ) +  [ (1 − τ) Y ¯ − θτ  ( Y ¯ − Y) ]  p c − κ (α) τ  ( Y ¯ − Y) − ρN .
As mentioned above, under the new policy, firms have to transfer part of the eva-
sion rents to consumers through discounts. An interior optimal solution  Y  ⁎⁎ satisfies 
the first order condition  dπ / dY = 0, 
(4)  [a +  a ′ (E) · E]  d c (1 + θ) = 1 − κ (α) .
The equation highlights two ways in which the firm’s evasion decision is affected 
by rewards to consumers. First, the marginal benefit of evading an extra dollar is 
reduced by  κ (α) . Therefore, the degree to which consumers value the program enter 
as an extra penalty for each dollar evaded. In this case, the more consumers value 
the rewards  α , the higher this  extra-penalty will be. Second, if consumers cannot 
commit not to  whistle-blow, the new detection probability will be increasing in the 
number of consumers  N as it increases the chances that consumers will inform the 
government about the evasion activity of firms.
The cost of collusion  ρN would affect the extensive margin decision between eva-
sion and full compliance, but not the intensive margin of compliance. In particular, if 
the payoff of full compliance and the collusion cost  (1 − τ) Y ¯ + ρN is larger than the 
expected value of taking the evasion gamble, the firm would shift to full compliance.21 
Note that the value of the transaction  y ¯ will matter for this policy because firms with 
the same true revenue  Y ¯ may be affected differently: firms that sell small ticket items 
(low  y ¯) would have to collude in a larger number of  transactions for a given total 
19 It is possible that  whistle-blowers affect the audit probability as well, and an alternative model could be 
written in line with Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez (2016) that assumes that one  whistle-blower triggers a full audit. 
The empirical implications in the next sections would be similar. Because information about audit rates or audit 
strategies are strictly confidential, it is not possible to distinguish in the data changes in audit rate from changes in 
detection ability conditional on audit. The conceptual distinction is useful, nonetheless, to illustrate how informa-
tion from consumer monitoring can augment the effectiveness of government audits even if there are no changes in 
audit rates, which implies a higher risk of evasion faced by taxpayers.
20 I assume that if the firm is audited, the government will consider as tax evasion the amount not reported 
based on the posted price  y ¯ , not the discounted price. Therefore,  Y ¯ will be the true revenue of the firm, instead of the 
revenue net of transfers to consumers.
21 In online Appendix C, I consider an alternative model in which firms can selectively collude with some 
consumers but not others to minimize such fixed costs. In this case, the fixed cost will affect the intensive margin 
decision of firms to evade taxes. The key insights, however, can be achieved with this simpler version where firms 
have a collusion policy that applies to all transactions.
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 revenue  Y ¯. This effect should be empirically similar to the increased probability of 
getting caught evading through  whistle-blowers, although the  whistle-blower threat 
depends on the total number of different consumers, whereas the collusion cost effect 
depends on the sheer number of transactions as I discuss below.
Comparative Statics and Discussion.—The first-order conditions in both (2) and 
(4) can be expressed as  a +  a ′ (E) ∙ E = c , where  c is a function of parameters that 
are changing with the policy. With government monitoring only,  c = 1/ (d (1 + θ) ) . 
With consumer monitoring,  c =  (1 − κ (α) ) / ( d c (1 + θ) ) . Changes in  c translate 
into comparative statics of  E ∗ : if  c increases, the optimal evasion will also increase.22 
In this subsection, I discuss how each component of the policy affects the evasion 
decision of firms and its implications.
Value of Rewards: In a collusive deal, firms try to match the value of rewards 
provided by the government through a discount. The reward to consumers reduces  c 
and, therefore, decreases evasion. In particular, the higher the reward  α and the more 
consumers value the rewards  κ (α) , the higher the  extra-penalty per dollar evaded 
will be. In the empirical setting, the reward has a lottery component so it is possible 
that its value is actually higher than the monetary expected value of the program’s 
reward ( κ (α) > α ). As I discuss in Section IVB, a taste for gambling or behavioral 
biases in assessing the odds of winning prizes could inflate the perceived value of 
lottery rewards, making it particularly costly for a firm to replicate the government’s 
reward through a discount. The rewards, therefore, could have an effect on compli-
ance even without a  whistle-blower channel (i.e., unchanged detection ability of the 
government).
Further, the fact that the valuation of the benefit may differ from the monetary 
rewards could introduce a higher fixed cost in reaching a collusive deal. In the sim-
ple framework considered above, a larger  ρ could push firms to switch to com-
pliance. Considering a simple extension where the fixed cost  ρ for colluding with 
consumers increases with the gap between the perceived size of the reward and its 
monetary value, i.e., if  ρ (κ (α) − α) and  ρ ′ (κ (α) − α) > 0 , it could be the case 
that a reward scheme that is not straightforward for a firm to mimic (e.g., lottery) is 
relatively more  cost-effective for the government. The impact on consumers’ wel-
fare, however, depends on why there is such bias in the perceived value of rewards, 
and whether it affects “experienced” utility or only “decision” utility. I revisit this 
discussion in Section V.
Volume of Consumers: The enforcement change introduced by consumer moni-
toring is stronger the larger the increase in the detection probability. This compara-
tive statics follows from a drop in  c as  d c > d . The increase in compliance should 
increase with the volume of consumers for a given firm size or true revenue  Y ¯. This 
distinction between firm size and volume of consumers is relevant to shed light on a 
mechanism through which  third-party information affects compliance: exposure to 
 whistle-blower threats can decrease evasion.
22 The necessary assumption for monotonicity  ∂ E ∗ /∂ c = 1/ (2 a ′ (E) +  a ″ (E) E) > 0 is that  Ea (E) is convex, 
which is the same convexity assumption discussed above for the second-order condition.
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Volume of Transactions and Size of Transactions: In the simple framework pro-
posed above, there is one transaction for each consumer. Considering the case of 
multiple transactions per consumer, the number of transactions could matter through 
a different mechanism than the number of consumers: the larger the number of trans-
actions a firm has, the more this policy may increase compliance as the fixed costs 
 disproportionally affect firms that need to collude multiple times for a given firm 
size ( ρN ). Similarly, firms that sell small ticket items should be affected relatively 
more for a given firm size.
 Whistle-Blowers: If firms engage in a collusive deal but believe that consumers 
will likely never blow the whistle, perhaps because they have never seen a consumer 
blow the whistle, they may perceive  ε as being lower than it actually is. If this is the 
case, once firms observe consumers blowing the whistle, they may update upward 
their beliefs about  ε , which reduces  c and increases compliance. The data allow me 
to directly observe how firms react once they learn a consumer blew the whistle.
Firm Size: Even absent of consumer monitoring, larger firms arguably would be 
more at risk of getting caught for a given evasion level due to the number of inter-
nal or external informed parties (e.g., employees, buyers, suppliers) that may have 
information on tax evasion. In the model above, it would be as if  d was higher for 
larger firms to begin with and, therefore, their baseline level of compliance should 
be higher (higher  d lowers  c ). In other words, firm size alone could already gen-
erate variation in baseline exposure to  whistle-blower threats (e.g., from the total 
number of informed third parties that firms interact with). The consumer rewards 
policy introduces a new set of informed  third-parties: consumers that will ask for 
receipts and potentially learn about evasion (e.g., if they observe collusion through 
conditional discounts offers). In this case, the effect of the policy would be relatively 
larger for firms with a lower baseline  d , which can be tested in the data.
Government Revenue: The government transfers to consumers  ατ  Y ∗∗ . It is 
important to notice that because the government cannot distinguish between 
marginal and  infra-marginal sales, it rewards  infra-marginal sales as well. If we 
restrict attention to revenue from taxes only (without fines), the program should 
increase tax revenue if  Y  ⁎⁎ −  Y  ∗ > α Y ∗∗ . In other words, government revenue will 
increase if the tax base increase is larger than the tax base the government is forgoing. 
This implies that the percentage change in tax revenue will have to be at least 
 ( Y ∗∗ −  Y ∗ ) / Y ∗ > α/ (1 − α) to generate an increase in government revenue. If 
the baseline level of compliance is very low, the program would be particularly 
attractive. Also, if higher compliance can be achieved without rewarding every sin-
gle transaction (e.g., imperfect take-up by consumers), the program will be more 
 cost-effective. I revisit this discussion in Section V.23
23 Note that, for simplicity, I am assuming here that the increase in tax collection is proportional to the increase 
in reported revenue as it is modeled as a sales tax. The goal of this simplification is to flesh out how sales reporting, 
the margin directly affected by the policy, can change. The same logic would carry over to the VAT if the tax base  Y 
is the reported value added, and changes in reported expenses cannot fully offset changes in reported revenue. This 
is true in the data as I analyze in Section V.
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II. Institutional Background and Data
This section provides institutional background on the Nota Fiscal Paulista (NFP) 
policy, and the details of the program that are important for the empirical analysis. 
First, I briefly introduce the relevant features of the Brazilian tax system and the 
NFP policy. Then, I describe the datasets I use and sample definitions.24
A. Institutional Background
The State of São Paulo is the largest state in Brazil. It accounts for 34 percent 
of the country’s GDP, and has a population of 42 million people. The metropolitan 
area of São Paulo is the second-most populous in the Americas. The state of São 
Paulo depends mostly on its own tax revenue, as opposed to federal transfers.25 
States in Brazil have two main tax instruments: a tax on goods and certain services 
(ICMS) and a property tax on motor vehicles (IPVA).26 The ICMS is a value added 
tax (VAT), and it is the most important source of revenue in São Paulo. Because 
the ICMS is a  state-level tax in Brazil, its legislation and enforcement policies are 
determined by the states. The tax base includes goods and some services, the most 
common ICMS rate is 18 percent over the valued added, which is computed through 
a  credit-invoice method.27 As is common in VAT across the world, there is a thresh-
old below which firms pay taxes on gross revenue instead of the value added (Keen 
and Mintz 2004). Firms that have yearly gross revenue of less than US$1.2 million 
can choose to be in a simplified tax regime called SIMPLES in which firms pay 
taxes based on gross revenue. The ICMS average rate in the SIMPLES is 3.5 percent 
of gross revenue.28 The majority of the tax collected in retail comes from VAT firms 
(over 85 percent).
In 2007 the state of São Paulo collected US$27.2 billion with the ICMS, equiv-
alent to 7.6 percent of the state’s GDP. Overall, tax revenue in Brazil is high for 
developing country standards. Considering all taxes, tax revenue amounts to 34 per-
cent of the country’s GDP (International Monetary Fund 2011). Nonetheless, there 
are many reasons to believe that tax compliance is not perfect in Brazil. According 
to La Porta and Shleifer (2014), estimates of size of the country’s informal economy 
range from 19 percent to 34 percent of GDP. Unregistered firms are invisible to the 
24 Throughout the paper I will convert Brazilian reais to dollars using US$1 = R$2 exchange rate, which is the 
average exchange rate during the period of analysis (2004–2011).
25 When the NFP policy was implemented in 2007, São Paulo’s own tax revenue was 75 percent of its total rev-
enue according to the balance sheets of the Brazilian Treasury Department. Moreover, Haddad et al. (2011) argue 
that São Paulo state generated more than 40 percent of the federal tax revenue, while receiving less than 35 percent 
of federal transfers in 2005. Federal taxes include, for instance, individual and corporate income taxes, payroll 
taxes, and taxes on manufactured products.
26 The IPVA (Imposto sobre Propriedade de Veículos Automotores) and ICMS (Imposto sobre Circulação de 
Mercadorias e Serviços) typically account for 95 percent of the total tax collected by states. The other two sources 
of tax revenue are a tax on bequests and donations called ITCMD (Imposto sobre Transmissão Causa Mortis e 
Doações) and fees for public services.
27 On a monthly basis, firms declare how much taxes they owe based on their taxable sales (debits) and how 
much credit they have from purchases of goods and services taxed by ICMS (credits). The difference between tax 
debits and credits determine a firm’s tax liability. For the majority of goods, the ICMS rate is 18 percent. In some 
cases, a reduced rate of 7 percent or a higher rate of 25 percent is applied. The tax base covers goods and a few 
services, such as restaurants and electricity provision. Most services are part of the tax base of a municipal sales tax.
28 For more details about SIMPLES, see de Paula and Scheinkman (2010) or Monteiro and Assunção (2012).
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tax authority, and no taxes are levied directly on them. Formal firms have to report 
their activity to the tax authority on a monthly basis, and pay the ICMS in relation to 
their reported activity. Despite the tax authority’s monitoring, compliance by formal 
firms is also limited. In the World Business Environment Survey 2003, on average 
Brazilian formal firms claim that  20–30 percent of sales are not reported to the tax 
authority by a typical firm in their area of activity.29 When the NFP program was 
implemented, the Secretary of Finance of São Paulo at the time argued that the retail 
sector in the state evaded taxes on approximately 60 percent of its sales.30
B. The Nota Fiscal Paulista Program
The Nota Fiscal Paulista (NFP) program was created by the government of the 
state of São Paulo in October 2007 in order to reduce tax evasion of the state’s VAT, 
and to foster a culture of tax compliance.31 The idea behind the NFP program is to 
use consumers as “tax auditors” by introducing targeted incentives for consumers to 
ensure that firms report final sales. The incentives provided by the program replicate 
the VAT  self-enforcement already in place for business to business transactions; 
rewards are increasing in the value of the purchase such that buyers have incen-
tives to ask for receipts, and to make sure that the value of the purchase is reported 
correctly by the supplier. Therefore, the NFP program directly affects two forms of 
 under-reporting: (i) firms may not report a transaction at all, or (ii) firms may falsely 
claim a lower transaction value.32
In a nutshell, the program introduced the possibility of identifying an individual 
taxpayer number—henceforth, referred to as Social Security Number (SSN) equiv-
alents—on each receipt, and created a system of tax rebates and monthly lotteries 
so that final consumers have incentives to request receipts with their SSN. Since the 
process of reporting receipts to the tax authority is done by firms, and the consumer’s 
SSN is attached to it, consumers do not need to send their receipts to the tax authority 
to get the rewards, which markedly reduces consumer participation costs. Consumers 
have to create an online account at the tax authority’s website, which allows them to 
collect rewards and  cross-check the receipts issued with their SSNs. The online sys-
tem also allows consumers to file complaints about specific firms, which introduces 
a threat that consumers may act as  whistle-blowers (see online Appendix Figure A1).
Implementation: The reward system was introduced along with a system of 
transaction reporting through which firms were required to send electronically to 
29 The question in Batra, Kaufmann, and Stone (2003, p. 138) is “Recognizing the difficulties many enterprises 
face in fully complying with taxes and regulations, what percentage of the total sales would you estimate a typical 
firm in your area of activity keeps off the books: 1 (none); 2 ( 1–10 percent); 3 ( 11–20 percent); 4 ( 21–30 percent); 
5 (31–40 percent); 6 (41–50 percent); 7 (over 50 percent).” In the case of firms that sell to final consumers, the tax 
evasion problem is likely to be more severe since firms are smaller than in upstream sectors. In the same survey, 
the percentage of sales that are under-reported or not reported at all reaches  30–40 percent among smaller firms in 
Brazil.
30 Márcia De Chiara, “Sonegação de impostos equivale a 30% do PIB,” Estado de São Paulo, September 8, 
2007.
31 The NFP policy was framed as an incentive to improve tax morale. The official slogan of the policy was 
“Incentive Program for Fiscal Citizenship” (Programa de Incentivo à Cidadania Fiscal).
32 A common way to evade taxes in Brazil is to under-report the value of a sale. This type of evasion is infor-
mally known as “ meia-nota” or “ half-receipt” (do Amaral et al. 2010).
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the tax authority all receipts they issue, with or without a SSN. Previously, firms 
only reported monthly aggregated information and were required to keep all the sup-
porting documents and receipts in their books. With the new system, firms were also 
required to send the government individual sales information on a monthly basis.33 
Importantly, this new system did not change the technology of receipts issued by 
retail firms during the period of analysis (2004–2011). Billing machines that issue 
receipts with time stamps and serial codes (called Coupom Fiscal in Brazil) were 
already widespread in São Paulo in the early 2000s, and billing machines with real-
time electronic transmission of receipts directly to the tax authority (called Nota 
Fiscal de Consumidor Eletrônica in Brazil), which can be an important step to 
reduce tax evasion (see Eissa et al. 2014), only started being introduced in São Paulo 
in 2015. Therefore, the requirement to send disaggregated sales information alone, 
without incentives to consumers, should not change firm compliance behavior: firms 
could simply send to the tax authority information on individual transactions they 
were already reporting in their official books in the end of each month.34
Eligibility: The government leveraged the fact that SSNs are not considered sen-
sitive information in Brazil.35 Any person that holds a Brazilian SSN equivalent is 
eligible to participate in the program.36 No  preregistration is needed for consumers 
to be eligible for tax rebates, but consumers must create an online account at the tax 
authority’s website to be rewarded with lottery tickets for monthly cash prizes.
The Reward System: At the moment of purchase, the consumer may ask for the 
receipt, and give the cashier her SSN. Firms must send all receipts, with or without 
SSNs, to the tax authority on a monthly basis. As the tax authority receives the 
receipts, it creates an account for each SSN where it stores all receipt information 
and the tax rebates due from each receipt. If the consumer has an online account and 
has opted in for lotteries, the system also automatically generates a lottery ticket 
for every total of US$50 spent. Therefore, it does not matter if the US$50 comes 
from 1 receipt or 50 receipts of $1, which also means that the lottery tickets are not 
attached to specific purchases or shops. During the registration, a consumer may 
also opt to receive an  email every time a receipt is issued with her SSN. The online 
account displays how much consumers are rewarded for each transaction, and has 
tabs where a consumer can click to manage rewards and file complaints. Panel A of 
online Appendix Figure A1 shows an online account example, and panel B displays 
a receipt with a consumer’s SSN.
33 The system is called  TD-REDF (Transmissor de Dados para o Registro Eletrônico de Documento Fiscal, or 
Data Transmitter for Electronic Registration of Fiscal Document).
34 In addition, during the period of analysis, product codes and bar codes were not standardized so the itemized 
information was not used beyond the total value reported in each receipt that was used to calculate the rewards.
35 For instance, the Brazilian SSN equivalent (CPF) is written on checks under the signature line, and consumers 
are frequently asked for their CPF in business transactions. Also, Brazilians have multiple identification numbers 
that make identity theft more costly: individual identification, taxpayer number, a voter identification, a social 
security identification, among others.
36 Throughout the paper I will refer to the CPF (Cadastro de Pessoa Física) as SSN. I will focus on CPF holders 
only. They are the overwhelming majority of participants in the program. Some NFP participants have a CNPJ 
(Cadastro Nacional de Pessoa Jurídica), which is a SSN for firms. Charitable institutions and condominiums, for 
instance, also have CNPJ and receive the exact same benefits as final consumers.
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Tax Rebates: For a given receipt, consumers receive a tax rebate of 30 percent of 
the VAT paid by the final sale establishment in a month, i.e., it is only a share of the 
taxes paid by the retailer, not the total tax collected along the supply chain, shared 
among all consumers of that establishment who provided their SSN that month in 
proportion to their expenditure in that establishment and month. The calculation of 
the benefit, thus, is a function of an entire month’s worth of SSN receipts and resul-
tant tax paid by the final sales establishment.37 On average, the tax rebate is around 
1 percent of the total value of the purchase.38
Lotteries: NFP has held monthly lotteries since December 2008. For every US$50 
a consumer spends in NFP receipts per month, she receives one lottery ticket.39 If the 
consumer opts in for these lotteries while enrolling online, lottery tickets are auto-
matically generated based on the consumer’s total expenditures in NFP receipts as 
described above. Lottery draws are held around the fifteenth of each month, and each 
month 1.5 million prizes are distributed on average. Most prizes range from US$5 to 
US$25, and there are usually three large prizes from US$15,000 to US$500,000. On 
average, the expected value of a lottery ticket is 0.1 percent of the total purchase.
Collecting Rewards: Rewards can be (i) directly deposited into the consumer’s 
bank account, (ii) used to pay other state taxes, (iii) transferred to another person 
with an online account or to a charity. Consumers must have an online account to 
manage the rewards. Tax rebates are disbursed biannually. In April, tax rebates from 
July to December of the previous year are made available to consumers; in October 
the tax authority disburses tax rebates from purchases between January and June 
of the same year. Lottery prizes can be collected soon after the results are released. 
Consumers have up to five years to claim the benefits.
Complaints: Consumers may file complaints regarding a purchase made at a spe-
cific establishment up to the fifteenth of the month following the purchase. The con-
sumer must identify the establishment and select a reason for the complaint from a 
 five-option menu: (i) the establishment did not issue a receipt; (ii) the establishment 
refused to write the consumer’s SSN on the receipt; (iii) the establishment issued 
the receipt but did not register it electronically; (iv) there is a discrepancy between 
the information on the receipt issued to the consumer and the receipt registered 
37 If two consumers buy the same total value in the same shop and month they will receive the same tax rebate 
even if they bought different goods that may be taxed differently. This is partially due to the fact that the tax author-
ity can only use the total value of the receipt to calculate the rebate shares of each individual since the itemized 
information in the receipt was not standardized in the period of analysis. More precisely, if the firm has  N consum-
ers in a month, the benefit consumer  i receives from an NFP receipt depends directly on the total ICMS collected 
from establishment  e in month  m ( ICM S em 
total ), the total value of NFP purchases associated with consumer  i and 
establishment  e in month  m ( V iem ) and inversely on the total value of NFP purchases in establishment  e in month 
 m ( ∑ j=1 
N V jem ). Also, there is a cap on how much an individual consumer can receive: 7.5 percent of 
the total expenditure, which is 30 percent of the highest VAT rate (of 25 percent). Thus,  TaxRebate ime 
= min {0.3 ⋅  [ICM  S em total ×  ( V iem / ∑ j=1 N V jem ) ] , 0.075 ⋅  V iem } . 
38 The rebate value is 30 percent of the tax collected from the shop that sold the item. This is consistent with the 
fact that the value of taxes paid is 4 percent of the revenue on average. Therefore, for every dollar that she spends, 
she will get around 1 percent of cash rebate.
39 The lottery draw in month  m uses lottery tickets generated by expenditures in month  m − 4 . This  4-month gap 
is necessary in order to make sure that all disputes over missing or incorrect receipts are resolved before the lottery.
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 electronically at the tax authority; and (v) other reasons.40 Consumers receive a 
part of the fines paid by the firm as rewards instead of the usual monetary reward 
when they file a complaint that escalates to a fine. I do not observe, however, the 
consequences of a given complaint. In the empirical analysis, I therefore use all 
complaints.
Fines: Firms that do not issue the NFP receipt correctly are subject to penalties 
and potentially more comprehensive audits by the tax authority. Under tax law, firms 
can pay up to 100 percent of the evaded tax, and there are additional penalties for 
misreporting documents and receipts.41 If a firm issues a receipt with an individual 
SSN and misreports the transaction, the process of punishing firms is straightfor-
ward if the consumer has a SSN receipt as proof of purchase.42 In this case, there are 
fines applied by the consumer’s protection bureau PROCON (Fundação de Proteção 
e Defesa do Consumidor).
Time Line: NFP was implemented in the retail sector between October 2007 and 
December 2008. The tax rebate system and electronic submission of receipts was 
 phased-in by groups of sectors between October 2007 and May 2008. The online 
system to file complaints was available starting in October 2008; the first lottery 
draw was in December 2008. In April 2009, the tax authority disbursed tax rebates 
for the first time from all purchases since October 2007, and every  6 months thereaf-
ter the government disbursed tax rebates according to the schedule described above.
During the period of analysis from October 2007 to December 2011, 13 million 
people enrolled online at the tax authority’s website, which is 40 percent of the 
people ages 15 and above in the state. In a given month there are typically 5 mil-
lion more people asking for SSN receipts than there are online accounts. This gap 
highlights that the cost to start participating in the program is relatively small: no 
 preregistration is needed since one just needs to have a SSN; but enrolling online 
might be more costly. Over 40 million people asked for SSN receipts more than 
once.43 Over US$1.1 billion has been distributed in tax rebates and lottery prizes. 
During the period of analysis there was a total of 1,151,518 complaints sent to the 
tax authority by 135,102 different consumers regarding 134,054 different establish-
ments to the tax authority.
40 At that point the consumer does not need to provide evidence to support her complaint, and she can describe 
details of her case in a text box. The establishment is notified that a complaint was filed via  email or letter, and it 
has 10 days to respond to the complaint. If the consumer is not satisfied with the response, she can file an official 
complaint. Before this point, the tax authority is not involved in the case. If the consumer decides to file an official 
complaint, she has to submit supporting evidence by scanning or taking a picture of the receipt or any other proof 
of purchase. From that point onward, the tax authority and the Consumer Protection Bureau will review the case 
and apply fines accordingly.
41 For the legislation on tax penalties, Part IV, Violations Concerning Fiscal Documents and Tax Forms of 
Decree 45490/00.
42 Dyck, Morse, and Zingales (2010) find that, in the context of US corporate fraud, access to information and 
monetary rewards play an important role in encouraging  whistle-blowing.
43 Since any SSN holder in Brazil is eligible for the rewards, people in neighboring states may also participate 
(the total population of São Paulo is 42 million). Over 500,000 consumers with online accounts are from munici-
palities outside the state of São Paulo.
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C. Data and Sample Definition
In this section, I briefly describe each data source, and the summary statistics 
of the data. First, I present the  firm-level data and the main outcomes I examine 
in Section III. Second, I explain the datasets at the consumer level, and the key 
variables I use in Section IV. In both cases, I focus on features of the data most rele-
vant for my empirical analysis. Additional details on variable definitions and sample 
choices can be found in online Appendix B.
Firm Data.—I use administrative data on  de-identified  establishment-level tax 
returns and registry information from the Department of Finance of the state of São 
Paulo, Brazil, from January 2004 to December 2011.44 In the empirical for analysis, 
I restrict attention to the 605,994 firms that submitted tax returns between January 
2004 and December 2011, and are registered in a retail or wholesale sector. Also, I 
aggregate establishments by firms as it is likely that firms maximize their tax plan-
ning in a consolidated manner.45
Firm Characteristics: From the registry of firms of São Paulo, the main variable 
I use is the sector of activity. Sectors are defined according to a  seven-digit code of 
the Brazilian National Classification of Economic Activity (CNAE, version 2.1). 
The retail sectors are all the sectors that start with 47 plus motor vehicle retail under 
sectors that start with 45 and food services (bars and restaurants) in sectors that start 
with 56. Wholesale is defined by all sectors that start with 46, plus motor vehicle 
wholesale under sectors that start with 45. The sector definition is very detailed; 
for instance, 472 is Retail food, beverages, tobacco;  4722-9 is Retail meat and fish; 
and  4722-9/01 is Retail meat (butchery). Throughout the paper, sector refers to the 
 7-digit definition.
In the empirical analysis, I aggregate the  firm-level outcomes by sectors of activ-
ity between January 2004 and December 2011. There are 212 sectors: 92 in retail 
and 120 in wholesale. The sector panel has 20,352 monthly observations.
Reported Revenue: The NFP program aims to ensure that firms accurately report 
final sales. Accordingly, the gross revenue reported by a firm is the key variable 
directly affected by NFP. In addition, all firms must report their gross revenue to the 
tax authority on a monthly basis. Other outcomes such as tax liabilities and reported 
inputs require sample restrictions as described below. Therefore, this variable is the 
primary outcome in my empirical analysis of firm compliance. For more details on 
the specific forms used to construct this variable, see online Appendix B. Table 1 
describes the firm sample. Statistics for the firm sample include the monthly gross 
reported revenue by firm for the key groups I use in the empirical analysis.
44 Due to confidentiality reasons, I do not have access to data on audits rate or any information uncovered from 
audits. In addition, the data were  de-identified, and no establishment data were provided from sectors that have 
fewer than five establishments, or from sectors in which one establishment is responsible for over 90 percent of the 
sector’s tax revenue of that sector. In the groups of sectors I analyze, retail and wholesale, 126 establishments were 
excluded from a total of 1,035,933 establishments registered in São Paulo over the period of analysis.
45 All the results are robust to using establishments as the unit of analysis instead. In São Paulo, 94.08 percent 
of firms are a single establishment, and the average number of establishments per firm is 1.18.
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Tax Liabilities: It is possible that firms’ tax liabilities do not respond to the policy 
in the same way as reported revenue as it also depends on reported inputs. The data 
available to this study, however, have some limitations to look at tax liabilities by 
firms. The variable I observe in the data is the amount of tax a firm is due to remit 
to the tax authority, not their tax liability. There could be substantial differences 
between these two quantities. An important driver of this difference is tax with-
holding within the VAT chain: part of the tax that is due by a firm is withheld and 
remitted by a upstream or downstream trade partner. This measurement problem 
introduces mechanical drops and increases in tax liabilities by firms that are difficult 
to control for as withholding rules are based on products and I do not observe prod-
ucts. Yet, there are some sectors that are less affected by withholding than others. 
Therefore, in order to look at tax liabilities, I restrict attention to the subset of firms 
(henceforth, tax sample) that are in sectors with little tax withholding throughout the 
period of analysis such that the tax due I observe best approximates the tax liabilities 
of firms.46
46 To identify sectors less affected by withholding I proceed as follows: for firms in the VAT, which submit 
more detailed tax returns, I obtained an aggregation of the total values of input and output transactions that are in 
tax codes related to withholding. I aggregate these firms by sector, and calculate how much of total inputs and sales 
transactions are affected by withholding during the period of analysis. Then I restrict attention to sectors for which 
neither the input or output transactions affected by withholding represent more than 1 percent of the total input or 
output reported by VAT firms in those sectors. Further details on tax liability measurement can be found in online 
Appendix B.
Table 1—Descriptive Statistics
Observations Mean SD Time period
Firm sample
Retail firms 
 Reported revenue  37,717,931 18,209.68 459,832 Jan.2004–Dec.2011
 Number of receipts with SSN  12,838,202 174.30 12,925 Jan.2009–Dec.2011
 Number of consumers  12,838,202 106.18 7,047 Jan.2009–Dec.2011
Wholesale firms
 Reported revenue   3,494,539 95,147.40 384,970 Jan.2004–Dec.2011
Consumer sample
Number of receipts 181,032,084 8.75 9.23 Jan.2009–Dec.2011
Number of businesses 181,032,084 5.24 5.16 Jan.2009–Dec.2011
Tax rebate 181,032,084 4.66 8.18 Jan.2009–Dec.2011
Total expenditure in SSN receipts 181,032,084 502.89 1,060.49 Jan.2009–Dec.2011
Number of lottery tickets 181,032,084 1.40 4.86 Jan.2009–Dec.2011
Lottery prize value 181,032,084 0.57 3.33 Jan.2009–Dec.2011
Notes: Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the main variables for each data source: firms and consumers. All 
values are in US dollars (US$1 = R$2) and are measured monthly. Reported revenue is the monthly gross reported 
revenue by firms. Number of receipts with SSN is the monthly number of receipts firms report to the tax authority 
with the Social Security Numbers (SSNs) of the consumer. Number of consumers is the total number of different 
SSNs to which firms issue a receipt. The consumer sample includes consumers that participate in at least one lot-
tery between June 2009 and June 2011. Number of receipts is the total number of SSN receipts a consumer gets per 
month. Number of businesses is the number of different establishments for which a consumer gets SSN receipts per 
month. Tax rebate is the total tax rebate consumers get from the SSN receipts. Total expenditures in SSN receipts is 
the total amount of money (US$) spent with SSN receipts. Number of lottery tickets is the total number of lottery 
tickets a consumer holds per month. Lottery prize values is the total amount (US$) of lottery prizes per month. All 
variables in the consumer sample are assigned a zero when missing for a given time period. For details on the sam-
ple and data construction, see Section II and online Appendix B.
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Reported Inputs and Value Added: For firms registered in the VAT (as opposed 
to the turnover tax regime described in Section II), the tax returns include reported 
inputs. In order to understand the change in tax liabilities, it is helpful to analyze 
changes in expenses claimed and the resulting value added. For this analysis I restrict 
attention to firms that are registered as VAT throughout the period of analysis in 
order to be able to observe changes in reported expenses. This sample restriction is 
important as firms that switch in and out of the VAT will have gaps in their reported 
expenses due to the tax form they have to file.
Because the impact on tax liabilities, reported inputs, and value added use sub-
sets of firms, I show the effects on reported revenue for these samples to allow for a 
direct comparison with the overall sample.
Receipts: The  micro-data on receipts capture purchases by consumers between 
January 2009 and December 2011. For these receipts the data include: month and 
year it was issued, the total amount spent, and an establishment identifier. Therefore, 
starting in January 2009, I can calculate by firm how many receipts have a SSN on 
them and the total value of these receipts. The  micro-data with receipts detail linking 
individual to firms before January 2009 were not available to this study.
Complaints: Thirteen million individuals created an online account at the tax 
authority’s website from October 2007 to December 2011. From these accounts, 
it is possible to observe the time and quantity of complaints filed against specific 
establishments. The  whistle-blower analysis in Section IVA uses data on the timing 
of when a firm received its first complaint.
In order to reduce the influence of outliers, I winsorize the firms’ outcomes by 
their ninety-ninth percentile value using the monthly  micro-data panel, i.e., I replace 
all values above the ninety-ninth percentile of the reported revenue distribution by 
the ninety-ninth cutoff percentile value. Online Appendix A shows results using 
alternative top coding thresholds.
Consumer Data.— Consumer-level datasets are based on  de-identified adminis-
trative data from NFP receipts and from online account activity at the tax authority’s 
website.47 Importantly, the  consumer-level data was generated by the NFP program. 
Therefore, there is no “ pre-NFP” data on receipts, or any other individual charac-
teristic.48 Further details on data sources and measurement can be found in online 
Appendix B.
Receipts: As described above, the receipts data file captures purchases for which 
final consumers asked for SSN receipts between January 2009 and December 2011. 
The main variables I derive from the receipts dataset are (i) number of receipts: 
the total number of  SSN-identified receipts that a consumer asks for per month; 
47 For confidentiality reasons, no information that may identify individuals was available to this study. A 
“scrambled” unique identifier was created for each individual SSN, and no information on names or addresses was 
provided. Also, for a given receipt, the total amount spent is rounded to the nearest integer, and the final data contain 
no information on prices or products that were purchased.
48 The state tax authority has no information on individual income tax records or any other federal tax data. 
Apart from motor vehicle property information, state tax authorities do not usually collect data on individuals.
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(ii) total expenditures with a SSN: the total amount of money spent associated with 
the  SSN-identified receipts, aggregated by consumer, per month. In order to reduce 
the influence of outliers, I winsorize the number of receipts and total expenditure in 
SSN receipts by their ninety-ninth percentile value using monthly  micro-data.
Lotteries: From consumers’ online accounts, it is possible to observe the receipts 
they ask for, their participation in lotteries and the value of cash prizes.49 The main 
variables derived from the online account dataset are (i) number of lottery tickets: the 
total number of lottery tickets a consumer holds per month; (ii) and lottery prizes: 
the number of lottery prizes and the value of lottery prizes per month. I restrict atten-
tion to 24 lottery draws between July 2009 and June 2011, i.e., 6 months before and 
after the first and last lottery available for this analysis.
Consumer Sample: I restrict attention to 5,028,669 consumers who participated 
in the lotteries between July 2009 and June 2011. This number includes lottery win-
ners and a 10 percent random sample of  non-winners in each lottery draw. The sec-
ond panel of Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for these consumers. All the 
variables are “unconditional,” i.e., the number of lottery tickets, prizes and rebates 
consider the entire period that consumers could be asking for receipts and partic-
ipating in lotteries, so these variables take value 0 when consumers do not ask for 
receipts or are not registered yet to participate in the lotteries.
III. The Effect of  Third-Party Information Trails on Firm Compliance
To investigate the degree to which the availability of  third-party information trails 
introduced by consumer rewards for requesting receipts can improve firm compli-
ance, I begin by exploiting the impact of the introduction of the NFP program on 
revenue reported by firms using a  difference-in-differences (DD) research design. 
I focus here on firms’ reported revenue as it is the margin directly affected by the 
policy.
The identification strategy exploits variation in treatment intensity from the pol-
icy change. I compare two downstream sectors affected differently by the consumer 
monitoring program: retail and wholesale. NFP targets final consumer sales, so 
firms that sell mostly to final consumers are more affected than firms selling mostly 
to other firms. To exploit this difference I compare “treated” retail sectors to “con-
trol” wholesale sectors. I use a DD design to estimate changes in reported revenue 
by firms in each group before and after the implementation of the program.
Figure 1 shows descriptive statistics to motivate the comparison between retail 
and wholesale. Even though the NFP program is targeted at final consumer sales, 
consumers who purchased directly from wholesalers and manufacturers could 
enjoy the same reward benefits as in retail purchases. Panel A of Figure 1 shows 
the total number of receipts with a consumer’s SSN in each group of sectors. The 
 receipt-level data available to this study start in January 2009 only, but they clearly 
49 All data on approximately 90 consumers who won one of the top 3 lottery prizes of over US$500 were 
excluded from the datasets available to this study for confidentiality reasons. See online Appendix B for more 
details.
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show a  substantial difference in the magnitude of the number of receipts with SSN 
between the two groups of firms. Panel B of Figure 1 shows the share of revenue 
in each sector that is covered by SSN receipts. For retail sectors, this share reaches 
40 percent in 2011 while it is always below 9 percent in wholesale sectors in the 
period of analysis. The trends in both panels also indicate that take-up of the policy 
increased over time, suggesting that the impact of the policy may also be gradual 
rather than a sharp change at the onset of the policy.
One advantage of the data is that I observe a long time series of  pre-NFP obser-
vations of reported revenue changes in the sector groups. Thus, I can shed light 
on whether a key identification assumption in a DD holds: that trends in potential 
reported revenue changes are parallel for retail and wholesale sectors. Panel A of 
Figure 2 displays changes in total raw reported revenue by group of sectors from 
January 2004 to December 2011. In this figure, each data point is scaled by the aver-
age monthly reported revenue before the introduction of the NFP in October 2007 
for the group.
In panel A of Figure 2, retail and wholesale reported revenue changes closely 
trace each other until program implementation. The vertical lines highlight the key 
moments in the implementation of the program discussed in Section IIB. Following 
implementation, change in reported revenue gradually increases in retail sectors, 
relative to wholesale sectors. Online Appendix Figure A2 shows that the firms in the 
excluded sectors upstream behaved similarly to wholesale, which is consistent with 
the argument that firms that do more business to business transactions should be 
affected less by this policy. The gradual change in panel A of Figure 2 is consistent 
with the fact that the program was not implemented at once, and consumer partici-
pation increased steadily over time. Since the figure displays raw data, there is quite 
a bit of variation across months of the year due to the seasonality of consumption. In 
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Figure 1. NFP Receipts and Revenue Shares: Retail versus Wholesale
Notes: Panel A shows the aggregate number of SSN receipts issued by firms in retail versus wholesale sectors. The 
figure plots the raw data. The spikes around December of each year follows the seasonal variation in consumption. 
Panel B shows the share of the total reported revenue in retail that is covered by SSN receipts in retail sectors and 
wholesale sectors. Even though the program was created in October 2007, the data from the NFP program available 
for the analysis begins in January 2009. For more details, see Section II and online Appendix B. The two figures 
provide support to the intensity of treatment variation if the difference-in-differences research design discussed in 
Section III. They show how Retail sectors were affected relatively more than the wholesale sectors by the NFP pro-
gram, and that the take-up of the program gradually increased over time.
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particular, in retail sectors, reported revenue spikes each December, consistent with 
increased  holiday-related consumption.
In order to measure the effect of the program across time, I run a flexible DD 
specification that includes 17 time dummies for  6-month windows from 2004–2011, 
using October 2007 (the starting point of the program’s implementation) as a refer-
ence point, and using data aggregated at the  7-digit level in a balanced panel. Each 
 6-month window, denoted by  k , is associated with a dummy variable  Perio d t 
k , which 
equals 1 if month  t falls within window  k :50
(5)  ln  R st =  η s +  γ t +  ∑ 
k=−8
 
8
  β k (Trea t s · Perio d t k ) +  u st 
where  ln  R st is the log of reported revenue in sector  s and time  t ;  η s are  seven-digit 
sector fixed effects and  γ t are dummies for each month of each year. The vari-
able  Trea t s = 1 if sector  s is a retail sector, and  u st is clustered by sector. This 
specification allows me to show the treatment effect across time, while controlling 
for  finely-defined time and sector effects.
Panel B of Figure 2 plots the coefficients and the 95 percent confidence intervals 
from estimating equation (5) without a constant. The difference between the two 
groups is relatively constant before NFP. By the time the program is fully imple-
mented the difference in log reported revenue between the two groups begins to 
50 For instance,  Perio d t 
0 = 1 if  t ∈  [October 07, March 08] ,  Perio d t −1 = 1 if  t ∈  [April 07, September 07] , 
and  Perio d t 
1 = 1 if  t ∈  [April 08, September 08] .
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Figure 2. Effect of the Policy on Reported Revenue: Retail versus Wholesale
Notes: Panel A shows reported revenue changes for retail and wholesale sectors. Each line is the revenue reported 
by all firms aggregated by retail or wholesale scaled by the average monthly reported revenue before October 2007 
for each sector group. The figure plots the raw data. The are spikes around December of each year follows the sea-
sonal variation in consumption. The vertical lines highlight the key dates for the implementation of the NFP pro-
gram: phase-in of sectors begins in October 2007 and ends in May 2008, and the first lottery based on the purchases 
with SSN receipts was introduced in December 2008. Panel B plots regression coefficients from estimating spec-
ification (5) in Section III using a sample of 212 sectors between January 2004 and December 2011. The sector 
sample has 20,352 observations. The difference-in-differences (DD) coefficient displayed in the figure is estimated 
using the specification (6) in Section III where the DD variable is defined by the interaction between a dummy for 
retail sectors and a dummy that equals 1 for time periods after Ocobert 2007. Standard errors are clustered by sec-
tor. See online Appendix Figure A2 and panel B of Table A1 for robustness checks.
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grow. This effect, averaged across all  post-implementation periods, can be estimated 
from a standard DD specification,
(6)  ln  R st =  η s +  γ t + βTrea t s · Pos t t +  u st ,
where  Pos t t = 1 if  t ≥ October 2007 and  u st is clustered by sector. Panel B of 
Figure 2 displays the estimated DD coefficient  β ˆ from estimating equation (6). The 
results suggest that the NFP program induced a positive and significant 21 percent 
increase in reported revenue by firms across the  4-year period following implemen-
tation. Because I am exploiting differences in the treatment intensity across firms, 
the estimated effect is likely a lower bound of the program’s impact. The control 
group was also potentially affected by the policy: either directly from sales to final 
consumers or indirectly from the  self-enforcing properties of the VAT.
In addition, I use the  firm-level data to test whether the estimated DD effect in 
equation (6) is similar when controlling for firm  i fixed effects. The empirical strat-
egy is analogous to the  sector-level analysis
(7)  ln  R its =  η i + γPos t t + βTrea t ts · Pos t t +  ε its .
The  firm-level regression is run in a  two-period DD, for which the  t is collapsed 
by pre and post. The pre period is between January 2004 and September 2007, and 
the post period is between October 2007 and December 2011. This strategy avoids 
log of zero values in firms’ monthly data, and helps address serial correlation issues 
when computing standard errors (Bertrand, Duflo, and  Mullainathan 2004). The 
regressions are  dollar-weighted, i.e., each observation is weighted by its  pre-NFP 
value, such that each observation contributes to all regression estimates according 
to its economic scale to best approximate the sector  aggregate-level analysis. The 
term  ln  R its is the log of reported revenue where in firm  i in period  t and sector  s . The 
error  ε its is clustered by sector.
Column 1 of Table 2 shows the DD coefficient for the  firm-level regression. It 
is comparable to the aggregate effect: a 25 percent increase in reported revenue for 
retail firms compared to wholesale firms. This increase in compliance is sizable, and 
shows that incentives to consumers can indeed change firm’s ability to  under-report 
sales. The implications of this increase in compliance for tax revenue, however, are 
not obvious. There are two separate issues:  (i) such an increase in reported revenue 
may not generate a similar increase in tax revenue depending on how reported inputs 
are adjusted, and  (ii) the net increase in taxes can be lower as the government is for-
going tax revenue through rewards. Section V discusses these two points in detail.
I conduct a number of robustness checks for both the sector and  firm-level regres-
sions reported in online Appendix Table A1. The results are robust to winsorizing 
the top 5 percent or the top 0.1 percent to deal with the influence of outliers, and for 
clustering standard errors by firm instead of sector in the  firm-level estimation. In 
addition, in online Appendix Figure A3 I investigate whether the  retail-wholesale 
comparison is indeed capturing an increase in compliance from the NFP policy, 
rather than an increase in actual revenue or a  nationwide change in trends across the 
two groups of sectors. Based on aggregate numbers from the  tertiary sector annual 
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survey,51 the difference between retail and wholesale revenue is constant across 
time in Brazil, so there does not seem to be a nationwide  differential change in 
51 PAC (Pesquisa anual do comércio) from the Brazilian Census Bureau (IBGE) is an annual national survey 
conducted by IBGE based on a sample of formal firms in Brazil. The information reported to the survey can 
 more-accurately capture real economic activity as the survey data is highly confidential, and cannot be used to cross 
check information submitted to the government by firms.
Table 2—Reported Revenue Effect: Retail versus Wholesale
log reported revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DD (Post October 07 × retail) 0.254
[0.0722]
DD × large firms 0.253
[0.0732]
DD × small firms 0.350
[0.0511]
DD × high volume of different consumers 0.246
[0.0705]
DD × low volume of different consumers 0.0329
[0.0919]
DD × high volume of transactions 0.253
[0.0335]
DD × low volume of transactions 0.018
[0.0391]
DD × high value of transactions 0.097
[0.0689]
DD × low value of transactions 0.285
[0.0754]
3rd-order polynomial of firm size × DD X X X
Time fixed effects X X X X X
Firm fixed effects X X X X X
Observations 1,035,268 1,035,268 1,035,268 1,035,268 1,035,268
Adjusted R2 0.907 0.907 0.908 0.909 0.908
Notes: Table 2 displays the main coecients from firm regressions. The variable DD is defined as the interaction 
between a dummy for retail sectors (retail) and a dummy that equals 1 for time periods after October 2007 (Post 
October 07). The dependent variable is log of reported revenue by firm, and the data is collapsed into two periods: 
before and after October 2007. Time and firm fixed effects are included in all regressions. The regressions are dol-
lar-weighted (each observation is weighted by the pre-policy reported revenue) such that each observation contrib-
utes to all regression estimates according to its economic scale to best approximate the aggregate effect. Column 1 
shows the average DD estimate discussed in Section III. Columns 2 to 5 are discussed in Section IV. Column 2 splits 
firms in two groups: firms below the median of the baseline firm size distribution (Small firms) and firms above 
the median (Large firms). Column 3 splits retail sectors into two groups: sectors below the median volume of con-
sumers across sectors (Low volume of different consumers) and sectors above the median of volume of consumers 
(High volume of different consumers). Volume of different consumers is defined the average number of different 
SSNs reported in receipts by firms in a given sector between 2009 and 2011. Column 4 splits retail sectors into two 
groups: sectors below the median volume of transactions distribution across sectors (Low volume of receipts) and 
sectors above the median of volume of transactions (High volume of receipts). Volume of receipts is defined by the 
average number of transaction by firms in a given sector between 2009 and 2011. Column 5 aims to capture a sim-
ilar variation as in column 4, but it split retail sectors into two groups based on whether they are in sectors where 
transaction values are below the median transaction value across sectors (Low value of transactions) or above the 
median transaction value (High value of transactions). Transaction value is defined by the median transaction by 
firms in a given sector between 2009 and 2011. In order to control for firm size effects, the regressions in columns 
3–5 include a third-order polynomial interacted with the DD variable. Size is defined by the average reported rev-
enue by firms during a four-year period before program implementation. Standard errors are clustered at the sector 
level. See online Appendix Table A2 for robustness checks.
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 revenue between the two groups.52 Moreover, there is no such differential change 
in revenue for São Paulo firms in the survey data, which suggests that the effect 
observed in the tax data is indeed a reporting effect and not a real change in eco-
nomic activity.
IV. Mechanisms:  Whistle-Blower Threats and Collusion Costs
In order to investigate the mechanisms through which a consumer reward policy 
can improve compliance, I turn to the micro-data on firms, receipts, and consum-
ers following the predictions from the conceptual framework in Section I. First, I 
study the role of  whistle-blower threats by examining heterogeneous effects of the 
program, and by analyzing the behavior of firms after consumers blow the whistle. 
Second, I investigate the role of collusion costs. I discuss heterogeneous effects of 
the policy that could be linked to fixed costs from frictions in setting a collusive 
deal, and I analyze behavioral biases with respect to reward value that may amplify 
individual responses to rewards, making it more costly for firms to match the gov-
ernment incentives.
A.  Whistle-Blowers
Heterogeneous Effects.—I examine heterogeneity in the responses of firms to 
the NFP policy in order to shed light on how the government can credibly har-
ness the information consumers have on firms’ evasion to improve compliance. I 
begin by allowing the coefficient in specification (7) to be heterogeneous depend-
ing on the firm size distribution before the program. The sheer size of a firm could 
deter  under-reporting even absent of incentives to consumers since the number of 
 third-parties firms interact with can have a monitoring effect as discussed in Section I. 
Column 2 of Table 2 shows the DD coefficients separately for firms above (large 
firms) and below (small firms) the median firm size as measured by the  pre-program 
reported revenue. The results are in line with the idea that the program affected more 
small firms that were likely evading more in the baseline.
Then, I use the number of different consumers a firm typically faces in their sec-
tor of activity to capture the increased detection probability under consumer mon-
itoring: the larger the number of consumers the more likely it may be that one of 
those consumers will blow the whistle when the firm evades taxes. To construct this 
measure, I need to use data from the program, i.e., after implementation. In order to 
avoid using  firm-level information that may reflect the treatment effect, I use sector 
level variation. To define the number of different consumers I count the number of 
different unique SSNs per firm from the receipts data, and I rank retail sectors by the 
average number of unique SSNs per firm. I take this source of variation to the data 
using the following specification:
(8)  ln  R its =  η i + γPos t t +  ∑ 
m=1
 
2
 α m ( d ms ⋅ D D ts ) + f  ( x i ) ⋅ D D ts +  ε its .
52 The time period  post-NFP overlaps with the Great Recession in the United States. The Brazilian economy, 
however, was not as affected by this particular financial crisis during the period of analysis, and the survey data do 
not suggest heterogeneous effects across the two groups of sectors.
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As in specification (7), I run this regression as a  two-period DD, for which the 
data is collapsed by pre and post. Firm fixed effects are denoted by  η i . The term 
 f  ( x i ) is a  third-order polynomial of firm size as measured by the average reported 
revenue three years before the program, and  D D ts variable is the interaction between 
a dummy for retail sectors and a dummy that equals 1 for post October 2007. The 
error  ε its is clustered by sector. The dummy  d 1s = 1  if sector  s  is below the median 
of the number of different consumers distribution across sectors, and  d 2s = 1  if sec-
tor  s  is above the median. I flexibly control for firm size effect through an interaction 
of  D D ts with  f  ( x i ) to separate the overall size effect discussed above from the effect 
of number of different consumers as discussed in the conceptual framework.53
Column 3 of Table 2 shows that the effect is concentrated among firms that face 
a high number of different consumers. This program is changing the availability of 
information trails, and the threat imposed by potential  whistle-blowers might help 
to explain how this program can work despite collusion opportunities between the 
buyer and the seller.
 Whistle-Blower Event Study.—The evidence above indicates that  whistle-blower 
threats could be an important device to improve compliance. In order to further 
examine the effect of  whistle-blowers, I exploit a direct link between the participa-
tion of consumers in the enforcement effort and firm behavior. I use a dataset with 
over 1 million complaints to analyze how firms respond after a consumer blows the 
whistle. It is worth noting, though, that there does not need to be a link between the 
number of complaints and the size of the effect of the policy in equilibrium. For 
instance, in an extreme case that the policy shifts all firms to full compliance, no 
complaints would be observed in the data.
The degree to which a firm responds to a consumer blowing the whistle depends 
on their beliefs. If firms believe that the probability  ε from Section  I that a con-
sumer will blow the whistle is too low, perhaps because they have never seen a 
consumer blow the whistle, they perceive  ε as being lower than it actually is. If this 
is the case, once firms observe consumers blowing the whistle for the first time, they 
may update upward their beliefs about  ε , which increases compliance. Note that the 
beliefs do not have to be biased in a specific direction at baseline, just that some 
firms have beliefs that are too high and some others that are too low. Firms with 
beliefs that are too high may only learn very slowly (or even never) about the true 
probability because they will mostly comply. Firms with beliefs that are too low will 
learn more quickly about the true probability because at the beginning they may not 
comply as a result and will likely receive complaints. Therefore, it is possible that, 
on average, firms will update their beliefs upward after a first complaint, and thus 
increase compliance.
In the data, every month, a firm may receive a complaint from a consumer through 
the NFP website. A firm is typically notified by a complaint up to one month after it 
is submitted by the consumer. In order to study the effect of consumers’ complaints 
53 These results are robust to winsorizing the dependent variable at different cutoffs (0.1 percent and 5 percent 
instead of 1 percent). Standard errors are also robust to clustering at the firm or time level instead of sector. See 
online Appendix Table A2. Similarly to the average effect, the heterogeneous results are assumed to share a com-
mon trend with the overall sample of wholesalers conditional on heterogeneous effects by firm size.
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I examine the impact of the first complaint a firm gets from a consumer through the 
website. Different firms received their first complaints at different points in time, 
and I can exploit the timing of the first complaint to assess the response of firms. The 
likelihood of receiving a complaint in a given point in time, however, may be driven 
by the volume of sales leading up to the first complaint. Moreover, it is possible that 
firms that have a large volume of sales in a given month may be followed by a lower 
reported revenue in the next period due to mean reversion or other seasonal charac-
teristics. Therefore, exploiting the timing of the complaint alone might not be ideal, 
as subsequent changes in reporting patterns after the first complaint might reflect 
real changes in economic activity of the firm.
In order to circumvent  mean-reversion and other seasonal effects, I build a coun-
terfactual for each complaint event. I create an “ event-control” group composed of 
firms that did not receive their first complaints by a given event date. That is, these 
firms may have received complaints after event time zero, but not before or at event 
time zero. I use a subset of the firm sample defined in Section IIC. I consider only 
retail firms, and within retail I only retain the firms that did not exit before 2009. I 
use complaints that were filed between July 2009 and June 2011. Throughout this 
period, 134,054 or 25 percent of establishments received at least one complaint. 
Online Appendix B has more details about the samples.
For each firm, I consider the first complaint event as the first time any of its 
establishments received a complaint. I use a  reweighting method based on quartiles 
of the propensity score of getting a complaint in a given period to control for firm 
characteristics and past outcomes. For a detailed description of the propensity score 
and reweighting, see online Appendix B.54
Let  i ∈  {T, C} index each firm as “complaint”  T or a “ no-complaint”  C in a given 
month. Let  t o index the month in which an outcome is observed, and  t e index the 
month in which a consumer blows the whistle on the firm for the first time (the 
“ event-month”). Define  k ≡  t o −  t e as the number of “periods” or months after/
before the first complaint. I performed this  reweighting exercise separately for each 
month between July 2009 and June 2011, and I collapsed the data by  event-month 
 k ∈  [− 6, 6] using the propensity score weights for Figure 3.
Panel A of Figure 3 displays the number of receipts complaint and  no-complaint 
firms report to the tax authority, and panel B shows changes in reported revenue 
relative to 6 months before the first consumer blows the whistle. The  x-axis shows 
the distance in months  k to the first complaint or “ event-month.” The graph also 
displays the estimated DD coefficient from estimating the following equation in the 
 micro-data:
(9)  ln  Y iekt =  γ ie +  π t +  ϕ k + β ⋅  I iekt {k ≥ 0, ie = T} +  u iekt , 
where  ln  Y iekt is either the log of the number of receipts or the log of reported revenue 
that firm  i reports to the government in calendar month of event  e . The  event-month 
54 The propensity score of a firm receiving its first complaint at a given time is estimated for each complaint 
date using age of the firm, number of establishments by firm, dummies for legal nature of the firm, sector fixed 
effects, dummy for location in the metropolitan region of São Paulo, and the three lags of  third-order polynomials 
of reported revenue, reported receipts, SSN receipts and number of consumers.
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is indexed by  k and calendar date is indexed by  t . I control for calendar time fixed 
effects  π t ,  event-month fixed effects  ϕ k and for  firm-event fixed effects  γ ie . The same 
firm  i can be in  T or  C depending on the event as the control group draws from 
firms that did not yet receive a complaint by event  e . Therefore, I can control for 
 firm-event fixed effects to make sure I am only using variation within firm and event. 
Figure 3 displays the estimated DD coefficient  β ˆ from estimating equation (9) for a 
window  k ∈  [− 6, 6] around each event. Standard errors are clustered by event  e and 
are robust to clustering by firm or by  firm-event.
I find a significant 7 percent increase in the number of receipts firms issue and 
a significant 3 percent increase in reported revenue after firms receive their first 
complaint. The impact of the first complaint is capturing the overall impact of 
receiving complaints, as some firms received additional complaints after time zero. 
It can be interpreted as an increase in the perceived detection probability as firms 
learn that consumers can indeed share information with the government about their 
 noncompliance. Audit probabilities could change as a result, but even if audit rates 
do not change, firms could perceive a higher risk of getting caught as the govern-
ment is better informed. Note that it should be expected that this  whistle-blower 
effect is smaller than the overall effect in the aggregate analysis because firms have 
likely already increased compliance prior to any complaint, in anticipation of the 
risk that consumers will blow the whistle if they do not change compliance at all.
Together, the impact of consumers blowing the whistle and the heteroge-
neous effect of the  consumer-monitoring is consistent with the argument that 
DD coef. = 0.07
[0.006]
DD coef. = 0.03
[0.004]
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Figure 3. Whistle-Blower Effect on Firm Compliance
Notes: Panels A and B plot the changes in the total raw number of receipts firms issue and changes in reported rev-
enue to the government before and after a firm receives the first complaint. Both graphs display changes across 
event-time where each data point is scaled by the outcomes average before the first complaint (event-time zero). 
The Complaint group is composed of firms that received their first complaint at event-time zero. The No complaint 
group is composed of firms that did not receive their first complaint at event-time zero and firms that did not receive 
a complaint until December 2011. The outcome is averaged across groups and event times using weights based on 
quartiles of the propensity score to get the first complaint in a given calendar time. The propensity score is esti-
mated using age of the firm, number of establishments by firm, dummies for legal nature of the firm, sector fixed 
effects, dummy for location in the metropolitan region of São Paulo, and the three lags of third-order polynomials 
of reported revenue, reported receipts, SSN receipts and number of consumers (see online Appendix B for more 
details). The estimated DD coefficient displayed in each graph is based on estimating specification (9) described 
in Section IV using the micro-data and clustering the standard errors by the calendar date of the first complaint.
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 whistle-blowers can be an important part of the explanation for why  third-party 
reporting is so effective to ensure compliance. In the context of NFP, it can be a tool 
for the government to tap into the wealth of information that consumers elicit when 
asking for receipts from  hard-to-tax firms that self-report final sales.
In the case of NFP, 1 percent of consumers filed complaints about 20 percent of 
firms. This is not necessarily surprising as the number of consumers is much larger 
than the number of firms, but it highlights how this diffuse monitoring mechanism 
can improve enforcement even when most consumers are not willing to actively par-
ticipate in complaints. Arguably firms do not know which consumers among many 
who are asking for receipts are willing to be  whistle-blowers, so the government can 
exploit this information asymmetry to generate a deterrence effect from this diffuse 
monitoring.
B. Collusion Costs
As discussed in the conceptual framework, collusion can be costly above and 
beyond the additional risk of getting caught from  whistle-blower threats. First, if 
there are any frictions in setting a collusive deal, there could be a fixed cost per 
transaction that is being concealed. Second, the more consumers value rewards, the 
more firms need to compensate consumers in a collusive deal through discounts, 
which decreases the returns from evasion. In this subsection, I discuss heterogeneous 
results of the policy on firms that may face different collusion costs. Then, I provide 
evidence on consumer’s responses to the lottery rewards. I show that the program 
is salient by exploiting variation in the disbursement schedules of the monetary 
rewards. Then, I exploit variation from the monthly lotteries to investigate whether 
potential behavioral biases with respect to lotteries may amplify the response con-
sumers have from rewards.
Fixed Costs of Collusion.—The comparative statics discussion of Section I dis-
tinguishes between the number of consumers (that should affect  whistle-blower 
threats as discussed above), and the number of transactions or value of transactions 
(that should affect the cost of evasion for a given firm size). In order to shed light 
on this channel, I analyze heterogeneous responses to the policy by volume of trans-
actions and the receipt value. To construct these measures, I follow the same logic 
as in the number of different consumers described above. To define the volume of 
transactions I rank sectors based on the count of the average number of receipts per 
firm in retail. To define receipt value I calculate the median receipts per firm in retail 
and then I use the median value by sector to rank retailers.
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 2 show the results using specification (8) and dummies 
for sectors above and below the median volume of transactions and receipt value, 
respectively. The effect of the program is stronger for firms in sectors with high 
“ foot-traffic,” firms in sectors that have a high volume of transactions and small 
ticket items are affected more controlling for differential effects by firm size. These 
results are consistent with collusion costs being part of the mechanism through 
which  third-party information can affect compliance. Although there is room for 
collusion, the policy can introduce a concealment cost that  disproportionally affects 
firms that must collude multiple times to continue evading.
3059NARITOMI: CONSUMERS AS TAX AUDITORSVOL. 109 NO. 9
The heterogeneous effects by number of different consumers, volume of trans-
actions, and receipt value are picking up similar variation in the data, and it is dif-
ficult to identify the relative importance of each channel. Still, these patterns help 
shed light on the different mechanisms though which this policy can operate. These 
mechanisms could be related: the concealment costs are arguably due to the secre-
tive nature of collusion that is, arguably, a consequence of  whistle-blowers con-
cerns. If firms could openly announce clear discount policies to consumers, these 
fixed costs would be mitigated but they would run a higher risk of getting caught.
Consumers Responses to Rewards.—Now, I turn to the value of rewards to inves-
tigate how consumer behavior may contribute to the impact of the policy.
Are Consumers Paying Attention to the Rewards? I verify that the release of 
monthly lottery results is salient to consumers by examining changes in the volume 
of Google searches about NFP. Google data aggregate information from millions of 
searches, and they can meaningfully capture salient social patterns that other sur-
vey methods cannot capture as easily ( Stephens-Davidowitz 2014).55 Around the 
fifteenth of each month, the tax authority performs the lottery draws and releases 
information on lottery winners. A consumer can only check her lottery results by 
logging in to her online account at the tax authority’s website. The actual address 
is not straightforward to remember (http://www.nfp.fazenda.sp.gov.br); as a result, 
consumers looking for this address may search for the program’s name or initials.
Panel A of Figure 4 pools Google search data from the first to the last day of 
each month between  2008–2011, and it scales each data point by the first day of the 
month.56 From the figure, it is clear that there is an increase in search volume around 
the fifteenth of the month the tax authority releases the results of the lotteries: it is 
16 percent higher than on the first day of the month. The gray line displays data from 
searches with the word “futebol” (soccer in Portuguese) which provides a metric of 
how the general volume of Google searches varies within a month. Panel B shows 
that the timing of disbursement is also salient: the total amount of rewards requested 
for bank account deposits spike as soon as tax rebates become available every April 
and October.57
The Lottery Effect: I exploit variation from the monthly lotteries to investi-
gate whether potential behavioral biases with respect to lotteries may amplify the 
response consumers have from rewards. As detailed in Section 1, the more consum-
ers value the rewards  κ (α) , the more effective NFP will be in preventing tax evasion 
for a given reward  α . The lottery component of the rewards may leverage consum-
ers’ taste for gambling or individual behavioral biases. Friedman and Savage (1948) 
noted that many governments consider lotteries an effective way to raise revenue 
55 Hoopes, Reck, and Slemrod (2015) use Google and Wikipedia searches about US income tax to show that the 
propensity to search varies systematically with tax salience.
56 I exclude the months of April and October, during which the government disburses the tax rebates, to make 
sure that the search pattern is related to the lotteries.
57 As described in the previous section, the tax authority disburses tax rebates biannually. Consumers can use 
rewards in other ways, e.g., they can be transferred to a third party, used to pay other taxes or saved for a later 
deposit, so the total amount in the graph will not necessarily add up to the total amount available to consumers 
at that point in time.
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as individuals may be willing to pay for lotteries paying a negative expected value. 
 Filiz-Ozbay et al. (2015) find evidence that  prize-linked savings offered by commer-
cial banks and governments around the world may be more effective at increasing 
savings than regular interest payments with the same expected value.
In addition, the NFP monthly lotteries typically have three very large prizes (the 
top prize can be as large as US$500,000) and millions of small prizes, which is 
a payoff structure commonly seen in gambling games and  prize-linked savings 
accounts (Guillén and Tschoegl 2002). The skewness of the prize values may be 
a tool to create salience. Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2013) argue that when 
comparing alternative risky lotteries, individuals pay attention to the payoffs that are 
most different relative to their objective probabilities. If consumers exhibit behav-
ioral biases with respect to the NFP lotteries, it would be more difficult for firms to 
try and replicate the government’s rewards to avoid truthfully reporting their sales.
In order to shed light on the role of behavioral effects, I exploit the random 
variation in lottery wins to document consumer participation responses to lottery 
rewards. Consumers may use past wins as a signal of their likelihood of getting a 
lottery prize, which would be consistent with misperception of randomness and the 
use of heuristics in making choices under uncertainty. Guryan and Kearney (2008) 
find that consumers increased their estimate of the probability that a ticket bought 
from the store that sold a winning ticket in the past would be a lottery winner (the 
“lucky store effect”).58 I restrict attention to small cash prize wins of 5 dollars to 
58 They argue that consumers may rationalize the observed streaks by inferring heterogeneity in the data gener-
ating process. In the context of financial investments, Kaustia and Knüpfer (2008) find evidence of reinforcement 
learning in investors’ behavior: personally experienced outcomes are overweighted in future choices.
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Panel A. Timing of lottery results: Google
searches for Nota Fiscal Paulista
Panel B. Timing of tax rebate: rewards
claimed by consumers 
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Figure 4. Are Consumers Paying Attention to the Rewards Schedule?
Notes: Panel A displays the search volume from Google Trends website for Google searches with terms related to 
“nfp” or “nota scal paulista” or “nota paulista” pooled by day of the month from IPs addresses in the state of São 
Paulo between 2008 and 2011. It also displays searches for “futebol” (soccer in Portuguese) pooled by day of the 
month from IPs addresses in the state of Sao Pãulo for the same time period. The lottery results are released around 
the 15th of each month marked by the solid vertical line. As described in Section II, the tax authority does a bian-
nual disbursement of the tax rebates: every April and October, and creates salience for the program at different dates 
within the month. Panel B shows the data for rewards claimed across time: each data point is the total amount in 
millions of US$ requested for direct deposit in consumers bank accounts.
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investigate whether consumer participation increases after a lottery win. Because 
the value of the prize is small, a systematic change in behavior after a lottery win is 
arguably due to an increase in the perceived returns to participation in the program 
and not an income effect.
To analyze the effect of lotteries I create a natural “ event-control” group com-
posed of people that held the same number of lottery tickets in a given lottery 
but did not win prizes. I use the consumer sample defined in Section IIC. Let 
 i ∈  {T, C} index each consumer as “winners”   T or a “ non-winners”  C in a given 
month. I use a  reweighting method based on DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) 
to flexibly control for the number of lottery tickets individuals hold. I create bins for 
each possible number of lottery ticket holdings up to 40 tickets, which is the set of 
lottery tickets for which there is common support between the two groups.59 I then 
 reweight the  non-winners group such that each bin carries the same relative weight 
as the analogous bin in the winner group distribution across lottery ticket holdings. 
This method ensures that I use the random component of the lottery by matching the 
two groups based on the odds of winning prizes.60
Let  t o index the month in which an outcome is observed, and  t e index the month 
in which the consumer wins the lottery (the “ event-month”). Define  k ≡  t o −  t e as 
the number of “periods” or months after/before the lottery win. I performed this 
 reweighting exercise separately for each of the 24 lotteries of 5-dollar prizes. I then 
collapsed the data for each lottery by group and period  k ∈  [− 3, 6] using the DFL 
weights for Figure 5.
Panel A of Figure 5 displays the average number of receipts for which lottery 
winners and  non-winners ask before and after winning a  5-dollar prize. The  x-axis 
shows the distance in months to the lottery  k . Each graph displays the estimated 
DD coefficient from estimating the following equation in the  micro-data for  k ∈ 
[− 3, 6] :
(10)  y jekt =  γ je +  π t +  ϕ k + β ·  I jekt {k ≥ 0,  je = Win} +  u jekt , 
where  y jekt is the number of SSN receipts or the total value of receipts consumer  j 
asks for in “ event-month”  k and calendar month  t . I control for calendar time fixed 
effects  π t ,  event-month fixed effects  ϕ k and for  consumer-lottery draw fixed 
effects  γ je .
61 Standard errors are clustered by lottery draw, and are very similar if 
clustered by consumer.
Panel A of Figure 5 shows that there is a significant difference in consumer par-
ticipation in the program between lottery winners and  non-winners as measured by 
the number of receipts they ask for with their SSN. The evidence is consistent with a 
behavioral explanation, given that there is a significant 0.07 difference (0.5 percent 
59 Online Appendix Figure A5 shows an example of the distribution of lottery ticket holdings among winners 
and  non-winners. It is clear that the winner group typically holds more lottery tickets. Since the number of lottery 
tickets is determined by consumers’ participation, it is important to carefully control for the odds of winning.
60 For a detailed description of a similar application of  DFL-reweighting, see Yagan (2015). For more details on 
 reweighting, see online Appendix B.
61 The same consumer  j can be a winner and a  non-winner depending on the lottery draw as the control group 
is composed by a 10 percent random sample of consumers that did not win a prize in lottery draw  e , but could have 
won in another lottery draw. Therefore, I control for  consumer-lottery draw fixed effects. See online Appendix B for 
more details on the sampling and  reweighting.
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increase) between the number of receipts lottery winners and  non-winners ask for 
after winning a US$5 prize, and the effect persists after at least 6 months. Since 
the odds of winning are independent of past wins, the change in behavior observed 
in panel A of Figure 5 suggests that lottery wins could be working as a nudge by 
making the odds of winning more salient and reinforcing the propensity to ask for 
receipts. Alternatively, consumers could be using the past lottery win as a signal 
of luck, and therefore perceive a higher expected return from participating in the 
program.62
Panel B shows the effect of a  $5 win on the total value of receipts. There is a per-
sistent increase of US$2.5 on average in monthly expenditures after the lottery win. 
This increase is a change in behavior that lasts for at least 6 months after the lottery 
draw. If I run specification (10) in a collapsed data to observe the total expenditure 
before versus after the lottery win, there is a statistically significant increase in SSN 
receipts value of $16.14 (SE 3.08) after winning US$5. Therefore, the effect of the 
lottery win cannot be attributed to the cash prize alone.
An alternative explanation is that consumers use lottery wins as evidence that the 
program works as advertised. In online Appendix A, I study the effect of a US$5 win 
for a sample of individuals that won the lottery once before, in which case the effect 
of confirming that the program works should not be as relevant. Another alternative 
62 Online Appendix Figure A7 shows the same picture for all prize levels. As the size of the lottery win grows, 
the estimated effect is larger. This pattern indicates that the change in behavior is indeed due to the lottery win. The 
effect, however, is confounded with the fact that larger prizes are more relevant cash shocks that can increase the 
level of overall consumption.
Receipts = 0.0725
[0.0045]
Value receipts = 2.507
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Figure 5. The Effect of a 5-Dollar Lottery Win on Consumer Participation
Notes: The graphs show the raw data by month aggregating all lotteries from June 2009 to June 2011. The x-axis 
is the number of months since the individual participated in a lottery. The winner group got a cash prize of 
US$5 (R$10) and the non-winner group did not get any prize. Panel A plots the total number of receipts consumers 
ask in each group before and after the lottery draw at event-time zero. Panel B shows the total value of receipts (in 
US$) for each group before and after the lottery draw at event-time zero. Before taking the averages in each case, I 
create bins for each possible number of lottery ticket holdings from 1–40 tickets in each monthly lottery for 24 lot-
teries between June 2009 and June 2011. Then I reweight the non-winners group such that each bin carries the same 
relative weight as the winner group distribution across lottery ticket holdings (for more details, see online Appendix 
B). The DD coefficient displayed in each graph is based on estimating specification (10) in Section II using the 
micro-data and the lottery ticket weights. Standard errors are clustered by lottery draw.
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explanation is that individuals that do not win the lottery get discouraged from the 
lottery loss. To try to control for this issue, I compare winners of $5 prizes to $10 
prizes. The difference between the two groups is still a $5 cash prize, but both won 
the lottery. In both comparisons I find a statistically significant difference in the 
number of receipts consumers ask for after the lottery win that represents a 0.4 per-
cent change, which provides further support for the interpretation that a small cash 
prize can change winners’ behavior through a higher perceived returns to participa-
tion in the program. The results are reported in panels A and B of online Appendix 
Figure A6.
The data do not allow to tease out the exact behavioral bias that the government 
is exploiting, but the evidence suggests that the lottery component can be a rele-
vant mechanism to explain how NFP can generate enough consumer participation 
to improve enforcement. Lotteries are used in other contexts such as  lottery-linked 
savings accounts offered by commercial banks, possibility exploiting similar biases. 
Also, if people misperceive probabilities or simply have a taste for playing lotteries, 
it would be more costly for firms to match government’s incentives. Not only could 
it increase the necessary discount to make consumers let go of the receipts, it could 
also create a friction in pinning down the right discount level that may contribute to 
the collusion costs.
The relative effectiveness of lotteries compared to tax rebates would be a relevant 
comparison for a  cost-benefit analysis, but the variation in the data does not allow 
to distinguish the two in a compelling manner. As discussed in Section I, tax rebates 
could also be leveraging a behavioral effect if framing an additional gain in a sepa-
rate category (“rebate”) is valued more than an cash equivalent discount. Evaluating 
the relative effectiveness of different reward systems is an interesting avenue for 
future research.
V. Implications for Tax Policy
The results in the previous sections show that incentives for consumers to ensure 
that firms accurately report transactions can be an effective way to improve firm 
compliance in final sales transactions. The implications for tax policy and its wel-
fare consequences, however, require additional analysis. The effect on tax revenue 
does not necessarily have to mirror the increase in reported revenue as it depends 
on the extent to which expenses can be adjusted. Moreover, even if the effect of 
the policy on tax revenue is positive, it is crucial to evaluate such increase net of 
consumer rewards. There are also a number of additional costs and benefits for the 
government, firms, and consumers that should be considered in a welfare analysis. 
I begin this section by investigating the impact of the policy on tax revenue. Then, 
I discuss the welfare implications of different components of consumer rewards 
programs.
A. Tax Revenue Implications
It is possible that firms’ tax liabilities do not respond to the policy in the same way 
as reported revenue. In fact, the response could be proportionally larger or smaller. It 
could be larger if, for instance, firms in the VAT do not adjust their expenses. In this 
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case, the value added would increase proportionally more than the reported sales. 
The effect could also be smaller if expenses are adjusted to offset the increase in 
reported sales.63
In the context of enforcement of sales reporting in corporate income tax, Carrillo, 
Pomeranz, and Singhal (2017) and Slemrod et al. (2017) find that reported costs 
increase as well, partially offsetting the change from more accurate revenue report-
ing. In both cases, the cost increase occurred primarily in difficult to verify margins 
such as “Other expenses.” In the case of the VAT, the ability to adjust inputs tax credit 
is arguably relatively more limited as a tax credit must be another firms’ tax debit. 
However, VAT credit fraud is often a problem in VAT systems (Bird and Gendron 
2007), and there could be  under-reporting of inputs if buyers colluded with suppliers 
to  misreport transactions (Pomeranz 2015).
In order to investigate the effect of the policy on tax revenue, I begin by looking 
directly at the effect of the policy on firms’ tax liabilities. I focus on a subset of 
sectors with little tax withholding such that the total tax due reported by firms is a 
good measure of the total tax liability of a firm (tax sample).64 First, I run the same 
analysis as in Section III using the flexible DD specification (5) in the sector panel 
and the log of tax liabilities as an outcome. Panel A of Figure 6 shows the difference 
in tax liabilities between retail and wholesale sector. Similarly to reported revenue in 
panel B of Figure 2, there are parallel  pretrends before the introduction of the policy, 
and a clear increase in tax liabilities in retail relatively to wholesale after the policy. 
The DD estimate is a statistically significant 25.9 percent increase in tax liabilities, 
which is close to the figure for reported revenue in Section III.65
Panel A of Table 3 shows the results using  firm-level data and running the DD 
specification (7) for the tax sample. Column 1 shows the DD coefficient for the log 
of reported revenue for this subset of firms. The effect is a bit larger than in the main 
sample, but confidence intervals overlap. Column 2 shows the DD coefficient using 
the log of tax liabilities, and the results indicate a statistically significant 31.6 per-
cent increase in reported tax liabilities. Because the liability is zero in some cases, I 
also use a binary outcome for positive tax liability, but I find no effect on the exten-
sive margin.
The tax liability analysis above is limited to a subsample of sectors, so in order 
to shed light on the effect of the policy on total tax revenue, I look at changes in the 
tax revenue in São Paulo as a share of GDP compared to all other states combined 
(leaving São Paulo out) in panel B of Figure 6, using data from the Brazilian Central 
Bank. The figure shows a slight level shift in tax/GDP in São Paulo of 3.5 percent 
relative to the rest of the country after 2007. This increase is consistent with an 
effect of the policy on retail tax revenue similar to the 25.9 percent increase esti-
mated above as taxes in retail are less than 15 percent of the total tax revenue.
63 To illustrate this point let value added be  VA = Y − E , where  Y is reported revenue and  E is reported 
expenses, and let  δ x = Δx/x be the change in variable  x .  δ VA =  ( δ Y Y −  δ E E) / (Y − E) . If  δ Y =  δ E =  δ ¯, 
 δ VA =  δ ¯. Also, if  δ Y <  δ E ,  δ VA <  δ Y .
64 The data available to this study have some measurement challenges discussed in Section IIC and online 
Appendix B.
65 Online Appendix Figure A4 shows the results for reported revenue for the same subsample of sectors used in 
the tax liability results (tax sample). The point estimate is slightly larger (28 percent) than in the main sample, but 
the confidence intervals overlap.
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The evidence from both the  sector-level analysis and the  firm-level data suggest 
that the percentage change in tax liabilities is similar to the percentage change found 
in reported revenue. As discussed above, the similarity in the effect is not obvious 
 ex ante, since it depends on how input claims can be adjusted. Given the evidence so 
far, any change in reported inputs is not completely  offsetting the increase in reported 
revenue generated by the policy.66 In order to investigate reported expenses, I use 
data from a subset of firms that were in the VAT system throughout the period of 
analysis.67
Panel B of Table 3 shows the effect of the policy for firms in this subsample using 
specification (7). In column 1, I show the DD coefficient on the log of reported rev-
enue. The point estimate is also positive and statistically significant. It is again a bit 
larger than in the main sample but confidence intervals overlap. The DD effect on 
log of reported inputs in column 2 is significant and only slightly smaller than the 
effect on reported revenue. The effect on the value added defined by the difference 
between revenue and input is also significant and similar to the effect on reported 
revenue. Since some firms have  nonpositive value added, I also look at a binary 
outcome for positive value added in column 4. The effect is not statistically sig-
66 For firms outside the VAT, in the turnover regime, an increase in reported revenue would lead to a proportional 
increase in tax liabilities. However, the majority of the tax collected in retail comes from VAT firms (over 85 per-
cent), so the adjustment of expenses is still a relevant margin of response.
67 Firms may switch in and out of the VAT over the period of analysis. When firms are in the simplified tax 
regime, they do not report inputs as their tax base is turnover. Therefore, it is important to restrict attention to firms 
that never changed tax regimes to make sure reported inputs can be measured across time. For more details, see 
online Appendix B.
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Figure 6. Effect of the Policy on Tax Revenue
Notes: Panel A plots regression coefficients from estimating specification (5) using log of tax liabilities as the 
dependent and a sample of sectors for which total tax due best approximates the tax liability of firms between 
January 2004 and December 2011 (see online Appendix B for more detail). Similarly, the difference-in-differences 
(DD) coefficient displayed in the figure is estimated using log of tax liabilities as the dependent variable in spec-
ification (6). The DD variable is defined by the interaction between a dummy for retail sectors and a dummy that 
equals 1 for time  periods after October 2007. This sector sample has 5,088 observations and standard errors are 
clustered by sector. Online Appendix Figure A4 shows the effect of the policy on reported revenue using the same 
tax sample. Panel B shows total VAT revenue in São Paulo as a share of the state’s GDP comparing with total VAT 
collected in Brazil as a share of the total GDP in Brazil using data from the Brazilian Central Bank. The figures 
for Brazil include all Brazilian states leaving São Paulo out. Panel B of online Appendix Table A3 shows robust-
ness checks.
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nificant. Hence, even though firms do adjust inputs, there is still an increase in the 
value added, which is in line with the findings above where percentage change in tax 
liabilities is similar to the percentage change in reported revenue.
The results above suggest that the increase in compliance generated an increase 
in the effective tax rate. In online Appendix D, I study real responses to the policy 
by analyzing formal employment and number of firms in the market by  seven-digit 
sector. The evidence indicates that the increase in tax enforcement did not affect 
these outcomes during the period of analysis. The null effect may indicate that the 
implied increase in the effective tax rate is not large enough to affect firms along 
these margins, and may just reduce evasion rents. The lack of real responses is con-
sistent with the increase in reported revenue being a reporting effect, rather than 
Table 3—Tax Liability and Reported Expenses: Retail versus Wholesale
log of 
reported revenue
log of
tax liability
Positive tax
liability
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Tax sample
DD (post October 07 × retail) 0.311 0.316 0.043
[0.151] [0.137] [0.0350]
Firm fixed effects X X X
Time fixed effects X X X
Observations 167,110 133,950 167,110
Adjusted R2 0.85 0.876 0.801
log of
reported revenue
log of
reported inputs
log of reported 
value added
Positive
value added
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel B. Expenses, output and value added—firms that were always VAT
DD (post October 07 × retail) 0.363 0.302 0.387 0.019
[0.0824] [0.0833] [0.105] [0.0153]
Firm fixed effects X X X X
Time fixed effects X X X X
Observations 88,422 88,422 70,845 88,422
Adjusted R2 0.87 0.85 0.90 0.71
Notes: Table 3 displays the main coefficients form regressions described in Section V using the firm-level data. The 
variable DD is defined as the interaction between a dummy for retail sectors (Retail) and a dummy that equals 1 
for time periods after October 2007 (Post October 07). The data are collapsed into two periods: before and after 
October 2007. Time and firm fixed effects are included in all regressions. The regressions are dollar-weighted (each 
observation is weighted by the pre-policy reported revenue) such that each observation contributes to all regres-
sion estimates according to its economic scale to best approximate the aggregate effect. Panel A reports the results 
for a sample of firms (Tax sample) that are in sectors where there is little tax withholding and, therefore, the firm-
level reported tax liabilities in the data best approximates their own tax liabilities (see online Appendix B for more 
details). Column 1 shows the DD results for the log of reported revenue as in Table 2 column 1, but for the tax sam-
ple. The outcome in column 2 is the log of tax liabilities that excludes non-positive values, and column 3 reports 
the effect on a binary outcome of whether firms report positive liabilities. Panel B reports the coefficients for a 
sample of firms from all sectors that are registered as VAT throughout the data period (January 2004 – December 
2011). Column 1 shows the DD results for the log of reported revenue as in column 1 of Table 2 for this subsam-
ple. Column 2 shows the DD coefficient for the log reported inputs. The outcome in column 3 is the log of value 
added that excludes non-positive values, so column 4 reports the effect on a binary outcome of whether firms report 
positive value added. Standard errors are clustered at the sector level. See online Appendix Table A3 for robust-
ness checks.
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an actual increase in sales, in which case I could potentially observe an increase in 
employment or in the number of firms.
Tax Revenue Net of Rewards: The government of São Paulo is forgoing part 
of the tax revenue collected at the final consumer stage by paying the consumer 
rewards: both incremental revenue from the program, and  infra-marginal revenue. 
Therefore, even if the effect of the policy is positive, it is not clear that the program 
is able to increase revenue net of transfers.
To perform this calculation, consider the 25.9 percent point estimate change in 
tax liabilities from the sector-level results. The government is rewarding consumers 
with 33 percent of the tax collected in final sales transactions: 30 percent in tax 
rebate and 3 percent in lottery prizes. Considering that these rewards will be applied 
to 40 percent of the transactions (as shown in Figure 1), the total revenue increase 
net of rewards would then be 9.3 percent.68
There are also administrative costs on the government side that should be con-
sidered, but there is no official estimate of such costs. Even if they are substantial, it 
is important to note that the NFP is also arguably relying on the fact that some con-
sumers may never collect rewards. As of 2011, 50 percent of the rewards were not 
collected. In particular, there are 27 million consumers who asked for SSN receipts 
but did not enroll online in the first four years of the program, which is the only way 
one can claim rewards. Considering the unclaimed rewards, the total tax revenue net 
of rewards would have increased by 17.6 percent. This fact highlights two relevant 
aspects of the policy:  (i) the total revenue effect net of rewards could be larger as 
consumers leave money on the table;  (ii) there are  nontrivial costs for consumers to 
fully participate in this policy that should be considered in the welfare implications.
B. Welfare Discussion
So far, I have focused on the effects of consumer reward policies on firms and 
their impact on tax revenue. The welfare implications of such policies must also con-
sider social costs and benefits. For instance, improving enforcement could help tilt 
the playing field in retail away from firms that evade taxes toward the  most-efficient 
firms. Also, it is important to consider how such policies affect the government and 
consumers beyond redistributive effects of transfers from firms to the government 
(from additional taxes), or transfers from firms to consumers (through discounts in 
collusive deals).69
68 Consider an extreme case of 100 percent of receipts with a SSN. In this case, as discussed in the compar-
ative statics of Section I, the government would need an increase in tax collection by almost 50 percent (i.e., 
 0.33/(1 − 0.33) ) to break even because the reward is applied to all tax transaction at final sales. In the data, 40 per-
cent of the receipts will receive a reward, so the minimum increase in tax collection to break even becomes 15.2 per-
cent (i.e.,  (0.33 × 0.4)/(1 − 0.33 × 0.4) ).
69 On the firm side, I am abstracting from costs imposed by the program because firms are required to send 
receipts to the government irrespective of the NFP program. There could be additional time costs from having to 
enter the SSN digits in the receipts, but I am abstracting from those as there are readily available technologies that 
could eliminate such costs and are already being adopted in the context of consumer rewards. For instance, the NFP 
created consumer cards with bar codes that could be scanned to speed up the process. Another example is that the 
most recent receipt technology has a QR code that can be scanned by consumer rewards  smart-phone applications.
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The data available to this study do not allow to fully investigate the welfare impli-
cations of the NFP, so the aim of this section is to highlight some key points that 
should be considered in the design of consumer reward policies. Countries adopted 
different policy bundles, with varying generosity in the reward values and techno-
logical sophistication. I discuss the costs and benefits associated with two relevant 
dimensions of such policies and their welfare implications: (i) information and tax 
morale campaigns; (ii) monetary rewards.
Information and Tax Morale Campaigns: It is possible that consumers value tax 
compliance and have some local information on evasion by firms, but are not fully 
aware of the importance of official receipts nor of how to volunteer information on 
tax evasion to the government. In this case, an information campaign that fosters 
tax morale and emphasizes the importance of issuing receipts and how consumer 
can  whistle-blow firms could leverage a utility gain from a “warm glow” of contrib-
uting to an  anti-tax evasion program. From Section I, if consumers value receipts 
even absent of monetary rewards ( κ (0) > 0 ), they would ask for receipts and affect 
firm behavior through both mechanisms highlighted in Section IV:  whistle-blower 
threats and collusion costs as firms would have to offer discounts to compensate 
consumers for the utility they would gain from getting a receipt.
To fix ideas, assume that such a program without monetary rewards is able to 
improve firm compliance. In this case, the cost imposed on consumers is low as 
asking for receipts is driven by a utility gain from the “warm glow” effect, and 
consumer participation is not being subsidized through rewards. For the govern-
ment, there would be costs associated to running such campaigns and managing 
complaints from  whistle-blowers. In the case of São Paulo, there are no official 
numbers on the IT and personnel costs to run the NFP program, but new information 
technologies are making it cheaper for governments to invest in such information 
channels beyond tax enforcement.70 Without monetary rewards to consumers, the 
 cost-benefit of the policy would likely be positive for the government as it is har-
nessing a tax morale motivation of consumers to ask for receipts, and the govern-
ment is gathering new information for enforcement. It is worth noting, however, that 
there could be social costs from this additional surveillance by potentially lowering 
social cohesion and trust.
Monetary Rewards: Most policies of this kind offer rewards to consumers, 
through tax rebates, cash lotteries, or  in-kind prizes. If rewards are the main driver 
of the impact of such policies, it implies that there are costs (e.g., time costs) borne 
by the consumers that prevent them from asking for receipts, and that the rewards 
are working as a subsidy to increase the number of receipts requested by consumers. 
In this case, there could be a  dead-weight loss (e.g., from changing time allocation 
of consumers). Further, the fact that these rewards could be leveraging a behavioral 
effect complicates the welfare assessment. Considering that the behavioral effect 
amplifies the perceived size of the subsidy ( κ (α) > α ), the change in propensity 
to participate in the policy would be comparable to that of a higher reward rate. If 
70 For example, in Pakistan, the Punjab Citizens Feedback Monitoring Scheme allows citizens to report petty 
corruption and other public service delivery issues using their mobile phones (Bhatti, Kusek, and Verheijen 2014).
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 κ (α) > α from a utility gain because consumers enjoy playing the lottery, there 
is no additional cost to consumers. If rewards are leveraging a  misperception of 
 consumers (e.g.,  misperception of lottery probabilities), the effective gains would 
be lower than expected, so consumers could actually be worse off.
For the government, monetary rewards paid to consumers reduce the tax revenue 
it can obtain. Moreover, there are administrative costs associated with managing the 
rewards. In this case, rewards that leverage  nonfinancial incentives can be particu-
larly attractive. Taste for gambling and misperception of probabilities make lotter-
ies a  cost-effective reward. They are indeed widely used across the world in such 
programs.
In practice, many programs have a combination of information and tax morale 
campaigns and monetary rewards. There could be relevant complementarities 
between the two: if monetary rewards can be thought as a temporary nudge to shift 
social norms, the program could potentially generate a change in consumer’s pro-
pensity to ask for receipts even if the government eventually discontinues or reduces 
the rewards. It an is open question, though, whether there are long-term impacts of 
such programs. In addition, there could be concerns of monetary rewards crowding 
out intrinsic motivations to ask for receipts. In the case of São Paulo, consumers can 
donate their rewards to charities, which may increase utility from altruistic motives 
and mitigate these concerns.
In future research, it would be important to build more evidence on the relative 
 cost-effectiveness and welfare implications of different reward options: tax rebates, 
lotteries with  in-kind prizes, or cash lottery prizes. The composition of rewards is 
relevant for the costs of the program to the government, and it is likely key for 
consumer  take-up. A related open question is the critical mass level of consumer 
take-up that such programs need to obtain a sizable enforcement effect, and what is 
the most  cost-effective way to achieve it.
VI. Conclusion
Access to substantial  third-party information trails is widely believed to be criti-
cal for modern tax enforcement. This paper has investigated how the availability of 
 third-party information can improve firms’ compliance. I exploit administrative data 
and  quasi-experimental variation from a policy that rewards consumers for ensuring 
that firms accurately report final sales transactions to the government in São Paulo, 
Brazil.
I find that the program increased revenue reported in retail sectors by at least 
21 percent over four years. I examine heterogeneity across firms and consumer 
responses to rewards to shed light on the mechanisms. I find that the estimated effect 
is stronger for smaller firms, for sectors with a high number of different consum-
ers, high volume of transactions, and small ticket items. The findings are consistent 
with the argument that  whistle-blower threats and collusion costs could help explain 
how  self-enforcing incentives can be effective to harness  third-party information 
in a context of extensive opportunities for tax evasion. I also provide direct evi-
dence on the enforcement effect triggered by consumers blowing the whistle: firms 
report 7 percent more receipts and 3 percent more revenue after receiving their first 
complaint.
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Furthermore, I show that consumers are finely tuned to the incentives of the pro-
gram, and I exploit the random component of lottery rewards to investigate the effect 
of lotteries on consumer engagement with the policy. I find that consumers condi-
tion their participation on past lottery wins. Even small prizes generate a significant 
and steady increase in the number of receipts consumers request, and the total value 
of receipts. The results are consistent with the possibility that lotteries amplify con-
sumer responses due to behavioral biases, which would make it more costly for 
firms to try to match government incentives in order to collude with consumers.
Finally, I study the effect of the policy on tax liabilities. I find that tax revenue 
increased despite a significant adjustment in reported expenses. I calculate that the 
policy generated an increase in tax revenues of 9.3 percent net of rewards.
From a policy perspective, this study sheds light on how citizen engagement can 
be used as a monitoring tool in  hard-to-tax sectors with numerous small taxpayers 
in a participatory program. In the context of VAT systems, the results indicate that 
incentives to consumers can potentially help address the  last-mile problem of the 
VAT, which is a  well-known shortcoming of one of the most important and prevalent 
tax instruments in the world.
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